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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME)
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of
violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of
an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by worldrenowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles, and books.
Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the
challenges of the post-9/11 world.
Dr. Martin Murphy is the author of this case study, which
examines piracy in Somalia as well as international regimes that have
been established to deal with piracy. The ultimate outcome is an
analysis of what works and what does not work in countering piracy,
the reasons for the results so far, and future options. Maritime piracy is
not only a threat to shipping and global trade; it is linked to failed states
and has tentative links to terrorism as well.
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case
study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the
author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense,
the Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has
been made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is
ultimately responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the
study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to
provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics, including strategic,
operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral questions
confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make these
case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the
needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11
world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in highpressure situations.
3
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Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students
will probably find the extensive bibliography at the end of the case
helpful. Compiled by the case study authors and by CIWAG
researchers at the Naval War College, the bibliography is a selection of
the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you
find it useful, and look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases
and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War College.
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Author Biography
Martin Murphy is a Senior Fellow at the Michael S. Ansari Africa
Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States, in Washington,
D.C. He was previously a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University’s
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Nova Scotia and a Visiting Fellow
at London Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s
College, London. His books include Piracy, Terrorism and Irregular
Warfare at Sea: Navies Confront the 21st Century (Routledge, 2011);
Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa
(Columbia University Press, 2011); Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty
Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
(Columbia University Press, 2009), which was named one of the
outstanding academic titles of 2009 by the American Libraries
Association; and Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
(Routledge, 2007). Dr. Murphy received his MA (with distinction) and
PhD in Strategic Studies from the University of Reading, England.
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Acronyms
Afnet (African Fisheries Management)
AIAI (Al-ltihaad Al-islaami)
AMISOM (African Union mandated name)
AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia)
AORH (large fleet tanker)
AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
ASWJ (Ahlu Sunna Walijamaca)
AU (African Union)
CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia)
CTF (Combined Task Force)
EU NAVFOR (European Union Naval Force Somalia)
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
GPMG (general purpose machine gun)
HMS (Her Majesty’s Ship)
ICU (Islamic Courts Union)
IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority of Development in Eastern Africa)
IMO (International Maritime Organization)
IRGCN (Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy)
IRTCs (Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors)
IW (international waters)
LOS (Law of the Sea)
LTTE (Kiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)
MMWC (Merchant Marine Warfare Centre)
MSC-HOA (Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa)
MST (marine sniper team)
NAG (Northern Arabian Gulf)
OAF (Operation Enduring Freedom)
PAG (Pirate Action Groups)
ReCAAP (the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia)
RFA (Naval Fleet Auxiliary)
RM (Royal Marines)
RMSI (Regional Maritime Security Initiatives)
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ROE (rules of engagement)
RPG (rocket propelled grenade)
SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction)
SNMG1 (Standing NATO Maritime Group One)
SNMG2 (Standing NATO Maritime Group Two)
SOF (Special Operations Forces)
SSDF (Somalia Salvation Democratic Front)
TFG (Transitional Federal Government)
TNG (Transitional National Government)
TTW (territorial waters)
UAE (United Arab Emirates)
UNITAF (United Task Force)
UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia)
WFP (World Food Program)
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Teaching Questions

1. What are the key lessons of this case study for you? If you have
operational experience in the regions under discussion, does this
case study help to explain some of the dynamics that you
witnessed?
2. What are the main causes of piracy as identified by Murphy?
3. What other variables might lead to piracy?
4. Why is piracy so difficult to successfully supress?
5. How can adaptation and reassessment tackle piracy? How would
those tactics be seen by the local population of pirates – as a sign
of strength, or weakness?
6. How can conventional military forces be flexible enough to adapt
to pirates’ changing tactics?
7. Adaptation can lead to the opponent adapting, or evolving,
perhaps to a stronger position. Can this be avoided? How can this
evolution be recognized, and what should the effects of that
discovery be?
8. How can you apply this case study to other situations?
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I. Conflict Context and Background
A. The Chandlers: A Cautionary Tale
On Friday, October 23, 2009, a 38-foot yacht, the Lynn Rival,
was underway approximately 60 nautical miles (nm) off Port Victoria,
Seychelles, heading towards Tanzania via the Amirante Islands.1 On
board were Paul and Rachel Chandler, a British couple from the quiet
town of Tunbridge Wells in Kent. He was 59, a retired quantity
surveyor; she was 55 and had worked all her life as an economist. Paul
Chandler was asleep below deck while his wife took the helm. At 0230
two boats approached the yacht from the stern in the pitch darkness ,
the sound of their approach drowned by the noise of the Lynn Rival’s
own engine. When two shots shattered the night’s tranquility, what the
Chandlers’ lives had been up to that point no longer mattered. Their
retirement dream was over. What they were now, and would remain for
388 days, were hostages of Somali pirates.
The Chandlers were experienced sailors. They had invested
their retirement savings in a yacht that they were sailing around the
world. They were cognizant of the pirate threat. They had taken advice,
ensured their route took them no closer than 700nm from the Somali
coast, and had delayed their departure until they believed the sea was
too rough for the pirates to operate. All that had come to naught. Now
they were sitting in the cabin of their own boat, surrounded by men
with guns, ordered not to speak as they awaited the arrival of the pirate
1

Except as noted, the information in this vignette is drawn from the following
sources: ONI World-wide Threats to Shipping report, 4 November 2009
http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_200911041
00000.txt; Aislinn Laing. “Somali pirates claim responsibility for kidnapping
British sailing couple off Somalia,” Daily Telegraph, 27 October 2009; Lucy
Cockcroft, “Somali pirates: Listen to Paul Chandler’s phone call,” Daily
Telegraph, 29 October 2009; Will Longbottom and Michael Seamark,. “Brave
British couple kidnapped by Somali pirates tell of terrifying moment when
they were hijacked,” Daily Mail, 30 October 2009; David Jones, “They
stormed the boat firing wildly. I cried out: “No guns! No guns!”‘ Daily Mail,
27 November 2010; “Pirates demand $7 million for yacht couple, Britain
says,” CNN.com, 31 October 2010; Chris Smyth, “Pirates demand $7 million
for Paul and Rachel Chandler,” The Times, 30 October 2009.
12
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leader, who had directed the hijack from a unspecified mother ship
nearby. His name, it transpired, was Bugas. He was the 32-year old
scion of an influential Somali family, and when he found out they were
British he thought his ship had come in. As the days turned into weeks
and still he could not turn the couple into cash, he made their life a
living hell.
The pirates ordered the Chandlers to sail the Lynn Rival
towards Somalia while they ransacked it for money and valuables and
casually vandalized its fixtures and fittings. Recognizing that the
voyage would be slow, they radioed for support from other pirates
based in Haradheere, who dispatched a Singapore-registered container
ship, the Kota Wajah, that had been hijacked eight days earlier from
approximately 190nm north of Port Victoria, Seychelles. It was
anchored one mile off the coast near the town of Ceel Huur, about 70
miles north of the more famous pirate village of Haradheere, in the
remote Mudug region of central Somalia,and would became the
Chandlers’ home for 36 hours before they were ferried ashore.
On October 26, the Wave Knight, a Royal Fleet Auxiliary
(RFA) large fleet tanker, had been ordered to depart the Gulf of Aden
where it was operating in support of Coalition anti-piracy patrols and to
make all speed for the waters between Somalia and the Seychelles.
Tthe ship was manned largely by 75 civilians serving under naval
discipline, as well as 25 Royal Navy sailors and a 20-man detachment
of Royal Marines (RM) drawn from the Fleet Protection Group
embarked specifically to undertake vessel boarding, contested if
necessary. The 31,500-ton tanker sighted the 24,000-ton Kota Wajah
on the evening of October 28 and tried to intimidate her into changing
course by closing to within 300 feet, illuminating her with searchlights,
and firing bursts from its two 30mm bridge-mounted cannons. The
pirates’ response was to darken the container ship’s lights and return
fire using their own small arms. Twice during the night the Marines
were reportedly readied for action and the Merlin helicopter put on
stand-by. Twice they were ordered to stand down, even when the Lynn
Rival appeared. The Kota Wajah was slowed almost to a stop, a line
thrown across, and the yacht hauled in. Over a period of 20 minutes,
13
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the Wave Knight’s crew was able to observe the Chandlers being
transferred from their small yacht to the container ship as their
searchlights swept the scene. The Kota Wajah then turned languidly to
the east and made course for Somalia. The Wave Knight apparently
made no attempt to follow, waiting instead two hours for the frigate
HMS Cumberland to arrive. A photo shows the two ships in sight of
each other with the lonely Lynn Rival drifting between them. The Wave
Knight lifted it on board and eventually returned it to the UK.
One explanation for this reluctance to use force was that
Cumberland had a Special Boat Service team on board that had been
airlifted from the UK and dropped into the sea. For reasons unknown,
the team’s departure from the UK was delayed by six hours and they
arrived late in theatre. Because the Wave Knight alone was not able to
prevent or delay the Kota Wajah from meeting up with the yacht or
returning to Somalia, the SBS team was never used.2
On October 28, Commander John Harbour RN, a spokesman
for the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR), told
reporters that they had a yacht in sight but could not confirm it was the
Lynn Rival.
The Royal Navy revealed on November 13 that the Wave
Knight, had come “within 50 feet” of the yacht at one point. The Rules
of Engagement under which it was operating prevented the crew of one
hundred – mainly civilians, but armed with light weapons and equipped
with a helicopter – from intervening because of the risk to the hostages’
lives. The statement issued by the Navy in October, however, only
revealed the presence of the frigate HMS Cumberland. The RFA’s
presence only came to light as the result of an anonymous tip-off by a
member of its crew. The navy then said that the Wave Knight had tried

2

Nick Constable, “Royal Marines could have rescued pirate hostages but the
order to attack never came,” Daily Mail, 29 November 2009. N.B. UK
Ministry of Defence stated that 10, not 20, Marines were on board Wave
Knight.
14

Murphy: Piracy

“playing for time,” knowing that the Cumberland was making all speed
for the area, but the pirates had eluded it.3
The navy spokesman said that the Wave Knight had done “very
well under the circumstances.”4 This was not an opinion that Paul
Chandler shared in captivity three months later, saying that men on
board the Wave Knight had taken the pirates’ threats “at face value.
With hindsight, that might have been the opportunity to call their
bluff."5 In May 2010 he admitted that the navy’s decision might have
been the right one as he and his wife were still alive but added that “it
really makes them – the whole fleet of warships – a laughing stock and
that is what they are, a laughing stock for these people. They can’t do
anything.”6 The sharpest public criticism came from the combative exwar correspondent and national newspaper editor Max Hastings who
opined cuttingly that if the Royal Navy could not “act more effectively
to defend British interests and citizens on the high seas, then it becomes
hard to see what it exists for,” a comment that Britain’s head of navy,
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, was forced to respond to directly.7
It is important to acknowledge that there is a great difference
between mounting a boarding, even one that is opposed, and rescuing
hostages. Nonetheless, subsequent investigation threw doubt on much
of the navy’s portrayal of events, fueled in large measure by the
account given by the same angry and frustrated member of the Wave
Knight’s crew who had alerted the press originally. Most specifically,
although the ship was manned largely by 75 civilians serving under
naval discipline, 25 Royal Navy sailors were on board as well as a 20-

3

John Bingham, “Royal Navy watched helpless as pirates kidnapped yacht
couple Paul and Rachel Chandler,” Daily Telegraph, 13 November 2009.
4
Bingham, “Royal Navy watched helpless,”
5
Keme Nzeram, “‘Brutal treatment’ of pirate kidnap couple,” Channel 4
News, 31 January 2010.
6
Jonathan Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to Cameron,” Channel
4 News, 26 May 2010.
7
Max Hastings, “A cowardly navy, a cautious SAS and Britain’s humiliation
by a pirate rabble,” Daily Mail, 25 November 2009; Michael Evans, “Navy
could not rescue Paul and Rachel Chandler, says Admiral Stanhope,” The
Times, 28 November 2009.
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man detachment of Royal Marines (RM) drawn from the Fleet
Protection Group embarked specifically to undertake vessel boarding,
contested if necessary. Such detachments often deploy with a Marine
Sniper Team, although it is not known if one was on board at the time.
In additional to the Marines’ light infantry weapons up to and including
general purpose machine guns, the ship was equipped with its own
machine guns and two 30mm bridge-mounted cannons . However, the
cannons were probably part of the RN’s Automated Small-Caliber Gun
System designed to protect the RFA against fast-moving small craft
equipped with rickets and crew-manned small arms. They would not
have been suitable for use in the hostage situation that the ship found
itself in.
When the Kota Wajah made landfall, apparently at Haradheere,
local elders reportedly refused to allow the pirates to put the Chandlers
ashore, forcing the pirates to move them to a Spanish trawler
(presumably the Alakrana, see below). They were subsequently
transferred to a skiff and taken ashore elsewhere. A local fisherman
said they were met by a group of 30 more pirates who had arrived in
“luxury vehicles” and fired into the air to drive curious onlookers away.
The Chandlers were taken to an isolated settlement located 100 miles
inland, where the pirates supplied them with basic necessities such as
bedding and water buckets, and began to feed them three rudimentary
meals a day. On October 30, it was reported that the pirates had called
the BBC to demand a $7 million ransom. The pirate spokesman (named
Hassan in a Reuters report) said that the Chandlers had been “captured
by our brothers, who patrol the coast”, implying that they had been in
Somali waters illegally, despite the fact they were closer to the
Seychelles than to Somalia when they were captured and outside even
the 200nm territorial limit that had been asserted by the last functioning
Somali government but never recognized under international law.8 He
went on the justify the demand by saying that “Nato operations have
had a lot of negative impact here — they have destroyed a lot of
equipment belonging to the poor local fishermen. They arrest fishermen
8

Laing, “Somali pirates claim responsibility for kidnapping.”
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and destroy their equipment, in defiance of our local administrations.
They illegally transfer the fishermen to their own prisons, and prisons
of other foreign countries, so when you consider the damage and all the
people affected, we say the amount is not big.”9
Straight away the British government said it would not
negotiate with hostage-takers. At the same time another pirate
spokesman, Mohamed Hussein, (or possibly the same one using a
different name) threatened that if any attempt was made to rescue to
Chandlers the pirates would “burn their two people’s bones,” while a
third told a Spanish news agency that the group who had captured the
Chandlers was the same group who were holding the Spanish fishing
trawler the Alakrana, and any attempt to free one group of hostages
would result in retribution on the other.10
By November 20, the pirates were beginning to apply
additional pressure. Britain’s Channel 4 News broadcast a two-minute
video during which the Chandlers pleaded for their lives, saying the
pirates were “losing patience” because “there had been no response to
their demands for money.” They added that they had been told that they
would “not be fed or given water” and moreover that there was “a
terrorist gang at large in the country looking for us.”11
At the beginning of December, the Guardian newspaper
reported that a deal had been struck to pay the pirates a mere £100,000
($159,700) but had been blocked by the British government.12 The
source of the report was Nick Davis, the chairman of an private anti9

Smyth, “Pirates demand $7 million”; Duncan Gardham and Mike Pflanz,
“Somali pirates threaten to kill British couple,” Daily Telegraph, 28 October
2009.
10
Gardham and Pflanz, “Somali pirates threaten to kill British couple.” Two
pirates from the Alakrana were sentenced by a Spanish court to serve 439
years each, which will undoubtedly encourage many more Somali pirates to
surrender. See Al Goodman, “Somali pirates get 439-year sentences,”
CNN.com, 3 May 2011.
11
“British kidnap couple make video plea,” Channel 4 News, 20 November
2009; Damien Pearse, “Kidnapped British sailors fear they may be killed
within a week,” The Guardian, 20 November 2009.
12
Mark Townsend and Rajeev Syal, ““Ransom deal blocked for Somali
hostages, Paul and Rachel Chandler,” The Guardian, 6 December 2009.
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piracy organization, the Merchant Marine Warfare Centre, who had set
up an appeal and a website called “Save the Chandlers’ to campaign for
their release. Davis posted a message on the website in January 2010
repeating the claim that the British government had blocked the deal
while at the same time admitting that only $100 had been raised to date
and pleading for more.13 In a statement released shortly afterwards the
then-Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said that although the British
government would not pay ransom they could not stop individuals
doing so.14
In January 2010 the pirates’ impatience was becoming
palpable. They must by now have realized they were unlikely to
achieve anything like the payoff they wanted, while the cost of feeding
the couple and securing them from abduction by other groups was
increasing. Once again they forced the couple to make a video in an
attempt to increase the pressure. In it and in an interview following
their release the Chandlers revealed they had been taken off the Kota
Wajah and onDecember 14 separated and moved between different
locations.15 They said the reason was that the pirates saw aircraft
circling overhead. However, in the interview they gave following their
release they revealed that the real reason was that Bugus, the brutal
leader of the gang that was holding them, recognized that their spirits
would be weakened once they were apart and in that state would be
more willing to beg convincingly for money. It was during this period
they were both told they would be handed over to the militant Islamist
group al-Shabaab and Rachel Chandler was told separately that if that
happened she would be beheaded.16
13

“Solution for the release of British sailing couple,” Save the Chandlers, 22
January 2010 at http://www.savethechandlers.com/tag/nick-davis/
14
Damien Pearse, “Kidnapped British couple plead for help,” Sky News, 1
February 2010.
15
Although this report says the locations were “around Haradheere,” they
more likely to be around Adado, the settlement further inland that appears to
have been the main place where they were held.
16
David Jones, “Whipped, threatened with beheading and on the brink of
suicide,” Daily Mail, 29 November 2010. For further reading on the terrorist
group al-Shabaab, see Eloy E. Cuevas and Madeleine Wells, Somalia: Line in
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They were reunited for Christmas17 but nine days later were
being threatened with separation again. Their immediate response was
to go on a hunger strike in an attempt to force the pirates into agreeing
to keep them together. On January 5, Bugus, driven into a rage by their
defiance, first carried out a mock execution, then whipped them with a
stick before beating Rachel Chandler with a rifle butt and knocking out
two of her teeth.18 Afterwards they were kept apart for a further 86
days.19
In April an Islamist force advanced on Haradheere. This was
suggested initially to be al-Shabaab but later was determined to be
Hizbul Islam.20 The pirates were reported to have evacuated the town
and moved themselves and their hostages north by either ship or 4x4.21
Although the Chandlers were not forced to join the exodus, they were
the Sand : Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010) and “Counterterrorism
Calendar 2011: Al-Shabaab,” The National Counterterrorism Center
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (accessed July 15, 2011).
17
They celebrated by eating a bag of walnuts that the captain of the Kota
Wajah had given them before they left his ship and which they had kept
hidden for just such an occasion.
18
In an interview given to the news channel ITN in May, Paul Chandler
admitted this was the only real aggression they had faced. In the same
interview he also indicated that by May they had been held separately for 97
out of 200 days and the reason why they found it especially hard to bear was
because they had no children and they had rarely been apart during 30 years of
marriage. Even when they were reunited, they lived in constant fear that they
would again be parted. Jonathan Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to
Cameron,” Channel 4 News, 26 May 2010.
19
David Jones, “Whipped, threatened with beheading and on the brink of
suicide”; Julie Etchingham, “Paul and Rachel Chandler: ‘We’re so lucky to be
home,’” Sunday Telegraph, 28 November 2010; Nzeram, “‘Brutal treatment’
of pirate kidnap couple.”
20
For further reading on Hizbul Islam, see “Jane’s World Insurgency and
Terrorism: Hizbul Islam,” Jane’s http://articles.janes.com/articles/JanesWorld-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Hizbul-Islam-Somalia.html (accessed July
15, 2011) and Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek, Islam and Muslim
Politics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
21
Martin N. Murphy. Somalia:Tthe New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the
Horn of Africa (New York: Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2011), pp. 1423.
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moved deeper into the bush as their captors reacted nervously to the
changes, more so perhaps because Hizbul Islam said it would look for
the captives and release them unconditionally if they were found.22
Taking advantage of the confusion, a British journalist was able in May
to travel to Adado (Adaado) where he found the Chandlers were still
being held separately but that the pirates were growing increasingly
skeptical they would make any money out of them. They blamed the
couple’s lack of wealth and contrasted it with their claimed expenditure
of $77,000 per month, mainly on khat, a mildly narcotic leaf chewed
widely throughout Somalia.23 Towards the end of May the Chandlers
were reunited to take advantage of the change of government in the UK
following the 6th May election. In an interview with the same freelance
journalist, this time for ITN, they congratulated the incoming prime
minister, David Cameron, but added that if “the government is not
prepared to help, then they must say so, because the gangsters’
expectations and hopes have been raised at the thought of a new
government and there might be a new approach.”24
In fact the Chandlers’ family had raised £270,000 ($402,000).
In June they made the mistake of paying this to the pirates without
securing adequate assurances that they would be released. The money
was dropped from a light aircraft into the bush a short way outside
Adado. Once they had their hands on the money, the pirates reneged.25
The speculation was that the negotiators working on the family’s behalf

22

Matthew Weaver, “Somali pirates flee with British hostages,” The
Guardian, 27 April 2010.
23
Jamal Osman, “Somali Islamists vow to free British hostages from pirates,”
The Times, 9 May 2010. For more information on khat and its use by armed
groups, see Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters:
Complications, Dangers, and Responses (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2008)
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub850.pdf, accessed
July 15, 2011.
24
Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to Cameron.”
25
Barbara Jones, “Yacht couple Paul and Rachel Chandler.”
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had insufficient people on the ground that could ensure that the deal
went through.26
Nothing more was heard from or about the kidnapped couple
for over four months. Then, on November 14, it was announced that a
further ransom had been paid and that the Chandlers had been freed
into the care of Adado’s governor, Mohamed Aden Tiiceey.27 The
reason for the long period of silence was attributed largely to
disagreements among the pirates, with a series of deals being accepted
and then rejected.28 The real reason, however, was that the Chandler’s
family had won a High Court injunction on July 30 prohibiting any
mention of the couple or even the injunction’s existence (a so-called
“super-injunction’). It was granted because a British newspaper was on
the verge of publishing a story about a failed rescue bid in June that
might have affected their safely and was renewed regularly until the
couple was freed. This prevented the pirates from manipulating the
British government and upping the ransom demand by planting stories
about the Chandler’s health and mental state in the media.29
Although the final sum paid has never been revealed, the
assumption is that it totaled around £500,000 ($810,000), with the
original sum dropped to the pirates in May being topped-up with a
further payment in November, believed to be £280,000 ($453,600).30
Speculation about the provenance of the money started immediately.
On their way out of the country the Chandlers were diverted to
Mogadishu, where they were greeted by high officials of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), although not by the president
26
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Sharidf Ahmed. When the TFG claimed it had contributed the final
tranche of £100,000 ($162,000) that had convinced the pirates to let the
Chandlers go, many assumed that the money had been diverted from
the contributions that the British government made to keep the regime
in power. Both the British government and the TFG denied vigorously
that any such linkage had occurred. The British pointed out that they
(like the US) did not support the TFG directly but channeled all aid
through the UN.31
Whatever the British government’s role in the payment may
have been, most of the money appears to have been raised by the
Chandler’s family, by well-wishers and, most interestingly, by
members of the Somali diaspora community in the UK.32 The actual
amount raised by the community may not have been great but its
members did place the gang under enormous pressure to release the
British couple. In February 2010 about 1,000 Somali residents in
Britain gathered in central London to launch a fundraising campaign
called Somali UK Solidarity. The leader of a band called Qaylodhaan
composed a song calling for the Chandlers’ release and to help raise
money. Dahir Abdullahi Kadiye, a Somali who had made his home in
London and who the press loved to describe as a taxi driver, but was in
fact the owner of a taxi company, played a leading role in channeling
the community’s energy and interest in the case. He organized meetings
at which Somalis in London were encouraged to contact their relations
and friends still in Somalia to express their anger about the pirates’
actions. This pressure took its toll on the pirates’ morale, and
eventually Kadiye was able to travel to Adado and assist with the
hostage negotiation, even acting in a supervisor role in the final handover. His motivation, he told reporters, was “to end the humiliation of
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Somalis in the UK, because the British government has been good to us
and given us refuge.”
Another leading figure was Ridwaan Haji Abdiwali, a presenter
on the London-based satellite channel Universal TV, who dedicated his
Have Your Say program to the issue. This gave members of the Somali
community a very public platform to vent their anger over what was
happening. He interviewed Ali Gedow, a spokesman for the group
holding the Chandlers, calling him every week until Gedow demanded
that the pressure cease: “You are annoying us,” he said. “All we want is
the money. . In Somalia, Adbi Mohamed Elmi, a doctor based at
Magadishu’s Medina Hospital, also played a crucial role in the
Chandler’s survival, journeying regularly to Adado to monitor their
health. Although his status as a doctor gave him considerable standing
in the community, he too credits the Chandler’s release to the actions of
the Somali diaspora: “We mobilized all the elders and finally reached
our target,” he said.33
The ransom apparently was divided among about 40 people.
The largest share, between 30 and 50 percent, probably went to the
financiers, some of whom may have been based outside Somalia. The
men who attacked the yacht would have taken a larger share than those
who guarded the Chandlers during their captivity. The shopkeepers and
others who supplied food and water for the pirates when they were at
sea, food and necessities for the Chandlers when they were held on
land, bribes to local officials and pay-offs to the local community
would have taken the rest.34
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The final irony was that the pirates claimed that capturing the
Chandlers was an error. Ali Gedow, the spokesman who had been so
unsettled by the TV presenter Ridwaan Abdiwali, told the BBC that it
was “a mistake because they were not looking for the Chandlers, they
were looking for a ship. Maybe sometimes they accidentally find some
people.”35
In an interview given a year after her release, Rachel Chandler
gave her considered judgment on Somalia and her captors. “We are
not,” she said, “helping the situation by ignoring it. A whole generation
of young men is growing up in Somalia believing that piracy is easy
money. They have nothing to take them away from criminal activities.
But in many ways they are akin to young men who get led astray, in
our own inner cities, in gang crime of one sort or another.”36
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Discussion Questions

1. Strategic airlift, particularly airlift with the range and
navigational capability to deliver an air-dropped team to a
ship at sea, are not common assets. What should be the
appropriate role for high-demand, low-density assets in a
large territory when only two hostages are involved?
2. What is a reasonable length of time for a hostage rescue
to be developed and carried out? If a rescue cannot be
effected in a matter of days, does that indicate a failure on
the part of naval powers? What other factors might
complicate matters?
3. Which of these two possible alternatives is more
palatable: civilians being held hostage for a year, or
civilian casulties resulting from a rescue attempt? What
are other alternative courses of action, and what might
their outcomes be?
4. What would have been the consequences, political and
otherwise, if the Wave Knight had mounted a rescue that
failed or otherwise went badly?
5. Was Hastings’s question too harsh, or was it justified? If a
navy cannot defend the interests of citizens on the high
seas, what is it for?
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II. Somali Piracy in Historical and Strategic
Context
This section focuses on piracy in general and situates Somali
piracy in the context of the global arena. It discusses issues specific to
Somali piracy and explores specific incidents and the various responses
by the multiple groups affected by piracy.
Discussion Questions

1. How is Somali piracy different from piracy practiced
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

elsewhere?
What features of Somali piracy could be copied or replicated
elsewhere, e.g., Southeast Asia, the Gulf of Guinea? What
militates against mimicry?
What is meant when a state is described as “failed”? What are
the implications for security?
The economic impact of Somali piracy in the context of world
(or even regional) trade has been miniscule. Why should it
concern the United States or other maritime powers? If Somali
pirates increase the levels of violence towards hostages, would
this force greater military response?
Piracy has rarely been suppressed at sea. Navies have generally
had to operate against pirate bases from the sea. What are the
legal and political impediments to pursuing such a course of
action against the Somali pirates? What would need to change
to justify even limited land operations against pirate bases?
Would air operations – manned or unmanned—be justified
instead, and could they be an adequate substitute?
What would be the effect of making ransom payments illegal?
How could it be enforced?

26

Murphy: Piracy

Map 1: Pirate Headquarters and Bases in Somalia
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In 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) came
up with a tripartite classification of piracy, based on piracy in Southeast
Asia and the South China Sea:
 “low-level armed robbery,” opportunistic attacks mounted in
harbors or other places close to land,
 “medium-level armed assault and robbery,” or more
challenging assaults carried out further from shore, which
represented a greater challenge to ship safety and placed the crew
at risk, and
 “major criminal hijack,” that is, well-resourced and practiced
operations that used violence to secure not only the cargo on board
but often the ship itself.
This classification system was well-suited to piracy in that
specific region, but seems dated now. Seeing piracy largely as maritime
armed robbery, it left no room for kidnapping, an activity common to
piracy throughout history. It was also historically inaccurate in other
respects. Violence has always been the essence of piracy, with robbery
as a secondary characteristic. Any attempt to place what has occurred
off Somalia into context would need to acknowledge the existence of
six categories: (1) inland water assault; (2) assaults on local shipping
and fishing vessels close to shore; (3) assaults on commercial shipping
in coastal waters and straits, in both territorial waters and international
waters; (4) major assaults to take ships and/or cargo, almost always in
international waters; (5) major assaults to extract value from crew or
passengers, almost always in international waters; and (6) coastal
raiding. These are further described in Figure 1 below.
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Type
No.
1

Figure 1: Pirate assault categories
Category
Description
Inland water
assault (TTW)

Attacks mounted by
small bands who
may, or may not, use
or threaten violence
on ships in harbors
or anchorages

2

Assaults on
local shipping
and fishing
vessels close
to shore
(mainly in
TTW but
might occur in
IW)

This form of piracy
can often be
extremely violent
and may be
occasioned by
conflicts over fishing
rights; it also can be
persistent to the
point that the victims
regard it as a cost of
business

3

Assaults on
commercial
shipping in
coastal waters
and straits
(occurs in
both TTW and
IW)

Attacks mounted by
coastal raiders who
can use or, more
likely, threaten
violence;
perpetrators can both
arrive and depart
unseen with the
intention of stealing
29

Example
Commonplace in
harbors around the
world such as
Chittagong
(Bangladesh), Santos
(Brazil), Tanjong
Priok [Djakarta]
(Indonesia), Lagos
(Nigeria)
Attacks on fishing
vessels off the Ganges
Delta
Attacks by Indonesian
raiders on Malaysian
fishing fleets in the
Malacca Strait
Attacks on fishing
craft around the Sulu
Sea (Philippines)
Attacks on fishing
craft and local traders
around the Niger Delta
(Nigeria)
Common form of
piracy in Straits of
Malacca and
Singapore, and the
South China Sea
starting in the 1980s.
In the northern part of
the South China Sea,
the violence used was
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cash from the ship’s
safe and from the
crews’ quarters; it
can also involve
kidnap and ransom
(K&R)

Major
4
assaults
to take ship
and/or cargo
(almost
always in IW)

Attacks mounted by
highly professional
gangs in which the
cargo can be taken
and the ship either
abandoned or reregistered and used
to perpetrate
maritime insurance
fraud

Major
5
assaults
to extract
value from
crew or
passengers
(almost
always in IW)

Attacks mounted by
highly professional
gangs as above who
in this variant have
no interest in the
ship but focus on the
crew’s portable
wealth or ransom
value
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sometimes extreme,
e.g., the Cheung Son
(1998).
K&R incidents
occurred in the Straits
in the 2000s, most
significant of which
was the Idaten (2005)
A feature of Southeast
Asian piracy for a
decade starting in
early 1990s. Many of
the ships and cargoes
were diverted to
China; the ships used
for fraud were reregistered and used to
steal other cargoes; the
cycle could be
repeated as many as
nine times.
Also observed off
Lebanon during the
1980s civil war
Currently unique to
Somalia
The attacks on the
Vietnamese ”boat
people” arguably fell
into this category;
although not taken for
ransom, they were
stripped of their
valuables and many of
the women were sold
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into prostitution.
Historically, both men
and women would
have been sold into
slavery.
In the modern era,
coastal attacks have
taken place in the
Philippines, Borneo,
and Nigeria

Coastal
6
raiding

Raiding land-based
communities from
the sea for goods and
slaves. Currently
rare but historically
common
TTW: Territorial waters
IW: International waters (the high
seas)

Two related forms of marine assault need to be mentioned,
although neither are technically piracy. The first is politically motivated
assault carried out by non-state actors. Examples include the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who were believed to have carried out Type 4
assaults during the 1990s, and the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta, who carried out attacks against fixed offshore
installations in the 2000s, most famously on the Bonga floating
production and storage platform in 2008.37 These fail to satisfy the
international definition because piracy is restricted to attacks mounted
for “private,’ that is to say not political, ends.
The second are attacks carried out by government vessels, such
as those mounted by Chinese government vessels in the South China
Sea in the 1990s. They prompted public allegations by Indonesia and
an official complaint by Hong Kong, which was then still under British
control. There is now more reason to believe that at the time that these
interceptions took place, the vessels involved were operated by corrupt
local police and customs units and were not operating under the orders
of the central government. Indeed, Beijing launched a major campaign
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against official corruption in the southern coastal provinces starting in
1998. Similar incidents perpetrated by Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps
Navy (IRGCN) vessels occurred in the Northern Arabian Gulf between
2003 and 2007. These vessels might have been operated by
“freelancing” commanders, or they might have been an adjunct to the
campaign of low-level harassment that the Iranian regime has carried
out against Gulf shipping for over a decade. All these attacks fail the
modern legal test for piracy, which excludes actions undertaken by
government vessels.
A. Piracy and Its Suppression
Piracy has shared characteristics wherever it occurs, but in each
case these are ordered according to local circumstances and arise out of
local conditions. Provided outbreaks remain local, they can be
confronted locally or, in many cases, ignored. But piracy has another
characteristic, its mobility, which can make it a threat to international
shipping. When pirates operate outside a state’s territorial waters, they
can present a challenge to international good order at sea. Pirates have
been vilified as the enemies of all mankind since Cicero, but although
this resounding condemnation is rhetorically evocative, it has never had
any meaning unless and until powers with the necessary resources have
chosen to accept the challenge and defeat them. The general
assumption has been that the powers that have done so have been
predominantly naval, but although the capability to capture and kill
marauders at sea has been important, more critical has been the ability
to engage pirates on land violently or to transform pirate strongholds
into responsible communities. Powers capable of effecting that
transformation have always been relatively few in number.
Moreover, counter-piracy has rarely been undertaken solely
because pirates are bad people, and never in the absence of a clear
economic rationale. As powers have matured, that rationale has tended
to become less specific and more systemized, to the point where the
political appears to subsume the economic. Examples of this
systemization can be drawn from three security regimes: the Roman,
the British imperial, and the American-led collective. Rome first
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suppressed pirates because they competed with it for plunder, and later
to maintain order within its empire. Britain at first exploited then
suppressed piracy in line with its mercantilist trade policy, and later
suppressed it systematically to minimize disruptions to a maritime freetrading system, of which its empire was the largest and most
geographically dispersed component.
In the 21st century, this begs the question: what is the U.S.
interest in suppressing piracy? America is also the hegemon of a global
system, but is not an imperial power in any traditional sense. It presides
over an international system based on not only free trade but also
national self-determination. One consequence of this detachment is that
the economic rationale to intervene against piracy is no longer readily
identifiable; the previously clear link between national trade and
national interest has dissolved, replaced by the disembodied concept of
the global trading system. Sixty years of peace, ever-expanding
volumes of goods on the move, and the emergence of new and
substantial stakeholders such as China, Japan, Korea, and India have
spawned the notion that this trading system and its agent, the world’s
maritime system, are robust and self-sustaining. Such a judgment
smacks of complacency. It is one with the notion that order is based on
law and agreement alone and that force is no longer necessary; indeed,
it is an anachronism. In straitened economic times, it also plays into the
hands of those who argue that navies should focus on combating
“existential” threats.
But America is the ultimate guarantor of maritime freedom,
just as Rome and Britain were in the past. The role is loosely analogous
to the dollar’s position as the world’s reserve currency; it gives the
United States a huge advantage, one that the nation should fight to
retain and allow to be eroded only with the greatest reluctance. Any
navy that fails to protect trade has forgotten its roots. The U.S. Navy’s
failure, in tandem with its coalition partners, to curb the activities of the
Somali pirates raises doubts about America’s willingness to devote the
necessary political resources to make maritime security a reality,
doubts that in turn raise questions about its position as the natural
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leader of a global or regional maritime security regime.38 Yet the
rationale for U.S. action is compelling because, as Jakob Grygriel has
pointed out, failed states “are not only a source of domestic calamities;
they are also potentially a source of great power competition” and
because “America’s global rivals are doing what aspirant powers have
done at moments of transition for millennia … probing the top state on
the outer limits of its power commitments … reading America’s
responses to gauge how much latitude they have to make low-cost
revisions to the system in their favor.”39 Somalia, and the presence of
rival navies off its coast justified rhetorically by a common need to
suppress piracy, fits these descriptions well.
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B. Piracy and the Gulf of Aden

Map 2: Gulf of Aden

Somali piracy cannot be seen in isolation from the wider
geostrategic importance of free movement and safe passage to trade
between Europe and Asia and energy movements outbound from the
Arabian Gulf to much of the world. This importance has been brought
into sharper focus by the growing political turmoil in Yemen, which
has drawn attention on the fact that both sides of the Gulf of Aden
constitute a single geo-strategic entity. The eighteen-mile-wide Bab elMendeb is one of the world’s vital chokepoints. It is the gateway to the
Suez Canal, and its closure would block off the sea route upon which
this huge trade depends. Any realistic threat of complete closure would
provoke a major political and military response. However, the same
effect could be achieved using low-level attacks to persuade the
international shipping industry that the transit risks are too great and
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maritime traffic would have to divert around Africa, adding ten to
twelve days to a voyage. That threat would be one step nearer to
realization if one shore of the Gulf were to fall into hostile hands, and it
would increase substantially if both coasts were to fall under the sway
of organizations with a common purpose. Britain occupied Aden in the
19th century to guard the vital sea route to India and took control of
what is now Somaliland when France, its leading imperial rival,
threatened to expand its influence beyond the borders of the French
Coast of the Somalis, today’s Djibouti. It is worth at least noting that al
Qaeda’s two forays into maritime terrorism were both launched from
Yemen: the attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor in 2000 and the
attack on the MV Limburg off the oil port of Ash Shihr al Mukallah in
2002.
Yemen’s situation is not as desperate as Somalia’s. It is not a
failed state but is nonetheless politically fragile and economically
weak. The government is confronted by a rebellion by the Shi’ite
Houthi faction in the north adjoining the Saudi Arabian border, a
separatist movement in the south, and an al Qaeda faction, al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears ready to exploit
whatever breakdown occurs. The militant group Al-Shabaab has sworn
to support AQAP and to exploit the opportunity for the conflicts on
either side of the Gulf of Aden to become “increasingly intertwined,”
according to their Somali spokesman Mukhtar Robow. Although the
use of a reductionist lens to conflate two separate conflicts needs to be
resisted, contact has occurred between AQAP and al-Shabaab and
coordinated action cannot be ruled out in the future. If al-Shabaab
controlled the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden, the interchange
between the two groups would become easier.
A zone of instability stretching from Yemen to the Kenyan
border effectively exists now. The prospect that some or all of this area
could be turned into one where extremist Islamist groups predominated,
even if whatever control they exercised was less than complete, would
pose a significant threat to Kenya in the south, as far north as Egypt,
and ultimately to Israel. Maritime security in the Gulf of Aden would
be compromised and, as the pirates have demonstrated, shipping up to
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1,000nm (1852 km) out in the Indian Ocean could be affected. The
increasing availability and rapidly decreasing cost of lightweight
guided weapons, small enough to be mounted on and fired from small
craft, or with the range to be fired from the coast and targeted using
small fishing craft or lightweight drones, could add to this threat
substantially. The success pirates have achieved argues in favor of
buttressing Somaliland and Puntland to head off that possibility by
securing the Gulf’s southern shore.

C. Somali Piracy Since 1996
Pirate Groups Before 2006
For most of the period between 1996 and 2006, piracy off
Somali was a low-level activity. The groups that operated during this
period were the Puntland group and others from Kismayo, Marka, and
Haradheere-Hoboyo.
 Puntland: This group consisted of a number of small bands
based at Puntland’s Gulf of Aden coast around Boossaso and
Caluula. These groups, which engaged primarily in smuggling
people, arms, and drugs between their base areas and Yemen,
appeared to engage in piracy opportunistically. It was reported that
the pirates drawn from these bands provided the “Somali Marines”
(see below) with their initial training.40
 Kismayo: This was based in the southern port of Kismayo and
known as the “National Volunteer Coast Guard.” It attacked
fishing vessels and might have been a fishermens’ self-protection
force as it claimed.41
 Marka: This was a loose affiliation of small bands that
operated from the port of Marka south of Mogadishu and other
40
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smaller ports in the vicinity and engaged in smuggling as well as
piracy, but with little capacity to operate much outside the 12nm
limit of Somalia’s territorial waters. They were financed by Sheik
Yussuf Indohaadde, the warlord of the lower Shebelle in southern
Somalia.42
 Haradheere-Hoboyo: The group based here changed the face
of Somali piracy. Based between Hoboyo and Haradheere in the
central Mudug region but with clear connections to Puntland via
the port of Eyl, what became known as the “Somali Marines”
began operations in 2005. The UN reported that it was organized
along almost military lines: they identified a fleet admiral
(Mohammed Ali Hassan), an admiral (Mohamed Osman), and a
head of financial operations (Afweyne). Of these three, Afweyne
was the most important. It might be no more than a coincidence
that Puntland’s political leader, Abdullahi Yusuf, took over the
presidency of the TFG in October 2004 and the Haradheere group
took down its first ship in April 2005. The ship was an LPG carrier
named the Feisty Gas; it earned them a ransom of around
$300,000. The group appears to have been the product of a crossclan alliance between the Majerteen and the Suleiman with the
Suleiman – the Afweyne family in particular – providing the
business idea, financial acumen, and local connections that
enabled the group to operate safely and at relatively little cost in
the Mudug. The Majerteen, which effectively meant the political
leadership around Yusuf, may have furnished the initial capital,
political protection, and permission for Afweyne to hire
experienced pirates from among the Puntland group to train new
recruits. The group operated successfully and cohesively from the
time of its first attack in April 2005 to the arrival of an Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) force in August 2006. The pirates retreated
north in the face of this advance but were back in action by
November 2006, even before Ethipoia defeated the ICU in a short
war starting in late December 2006.
42
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Pirate Groups After 2006
After the ICU interlude, pirate activity outside the PuntlandMudug axis declined. The groups that had operated out of Marka and
Kismayo no longer appeared in reports, although occasional mention
was made of a group operating out of Mogadishu. The HaradheereHoboyo group’s original hierarchical structure appears to have
dissolved and been replaced by several smaller groups networked
loosely together through clan connections. Among these new groups
were ones based on the neighboring Hawiye Sa’ad and Darood Omar
Mahamoud sub-clans, the latter establishing Garad as a new piracy
center.
Since then, the Hardheere-Hoboyo group and its immediate
clan-based imitators appear to have broken down further. Clan linkages
and loyalties appear to have weakened and new, smaller, often ad hoc
gangs have emerged whose clan allegiance is less clear cut. This
change appears to have been driven by easier access to finance through
what might reasonably be termed “piracy markets.” Financiers no
longer appear to support one or two groups but instead entertain
propositions from a range of pirate leaders who can put forward a
credible business case.
One consequence of this greater financial accessibility may
have been an erosion of the remarkable sense of discipline that
characterized Somali pirate operations starting in 2004. Between then
and late 2010, hostages were protected. While their life was far from
pleasant, they were rarely subject to anything worse than verbal threats.
Starting in late 2010, freed hostages began to report more brutal
treatment along the lines of what the Chandlers encountered,
suggesting that the pirate model might be changing. To what extent this
assessment was correct remained difficult to determine, as so few
hostages were ever interviewed officially once they were released. In
fact, shipping companies often discouraged their employees from
talking about their experiences. The number of actual cases might have
been low; alternatively, the practice might have become widespread.
Obtaining a verifiable picture proved difficult.
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Nonetheless, what appeared to be taking place was that at least
some pirates were willing to threaten hostages with violence and even
torture in an effort to secure larger and/or more quickly paid payments.
One school of thought suggested that this abuse was becoming
systematic; greed was driving pirates to harm hostages deliberately in
an attempt to force the insurers to pay higher ransoms, more speedily.
A second school suggested that the greater availability of finance had
encouraged the entrepreneurial formation of new bands built around
one or more experienced pirate leaders, with the actual assaults
conducted by recruits drawn from Somalia’s interior. These new
arrivals were less well-trained and too eager for money to see the
wisdom of the original business model. According to this
interpretation, the essential problem was that the growth in pirate
activity meant that the number of experienced pirates available to
educate the new men and maintain discipline had exceeded supply.
This school pointed to a developing shortage of navigators and boat
handlers as another indicator that the original pool of experienced
hands was becoming stretched. Reports suggested that in a few cases
cases these key positions were being filled by contracted foreign
nationals from Yemen, Pakistan, and India.43
A third explanation was that the pirates’ turn to violence might
be a rational—albeit misguided—response to the decline in their attackcapture ratio, brought about by the navies’ more aggressive tactics and
by better self-protection measures by merchant ships. Because they
could capture fewer ships, the pirates had to achieve a better rate of
return on a more limited number of captures. Consequently, they had to
work the assets they did capture harder in order to secure ransoms that
were larger and that were paid more quickly. The costs of holding
hostages securely had also increased: the influx of ransom money was
known to have increased inflation in the coastal areas where the pirates
operated, with high prices being charged for food and, more
importantly, for khat, the mild narcotic that the pirates consumed in
large quantities. Hostages had always been at risk of being snatched by
43
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other gangs, particularly at sea, but now the risk on land had increased,
forcing pirates to pay for armed guards to protect their operations.
D. Pirate Adaptation and Exploitation
Somali pirates have proved to be masters of adaptation
strategically and tactically, molding and remolding their methods to
better exploit the chaos within Somalia and in the international
maritime order, while remaining single-mindedly focused on making
money from the difference between the value of human life within
Somalia and without. Access to sanctuary has been crucial: they have
been able to exploit states’ reluctance to become involved in the
violence and disorder within Somalia as well as their general reluctance
to intervene in another state’s affairs, however dysfunctional that state
might be.
Discussion Questions

1. What pirate adaptations might we expect to see in the future?
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

What naval escalations might we see as a result?
How can naval forces change from reacting to pirates’ adaptive
tactics to anticipating them?
What might be some political ramifications of such a change?
Would a decapitation strategy against pirate leaders yield
results? What counter-measures could the pirates adopt?
How could the pirate groups be induced to fight each other?
What has been the effect of “catch and release” on naval
policy? On naval effectiveness?
Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has dropped
significantly since mid-2000s. What factors account for this
decline? Are they all security-related? What security measures
adopted in Southeast Asia may be effective off Somalia? What
needs to change politically to make them work?
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Access to sanctuary also enabled the pirate groups to maximize
their profits. Although isolated incidents of crew members being
kidnapped had occurred in the Strait of Malacca in the 2000s, the
pirates there found it difficult and probably relatively expensive to hold
their captives for long. This was not the case in Somalia, where
hostages could be held on board their own ships anchored off the coast
in the relative certainty that no rescue attempt would be attempted, that
no internal rescue would be mounted unless the authorities near where
the ship was moored had not been paid, and that there were few rival
groups who would attempt to steal them.
The pirates would have to have been blind not to have quickly
recognized that the states that sent ships to patrol Somali waters were
exceedingly reluctant to put them in jail. As mentioned above, attention
was first drawn to this in September 2008 when the HDMS Absalom
returned ten pirates that it had captured, minus their equipment, to their
departure point on the Somali coast. From then on, pirates knew that
even if they were captured there was a good chance that the worst that
was likely to happen was that they would be deprived of their guns,
boarding ladders, communication devices, and possibly their skiffs.
They would certainly be sent back to where they came from unharmed,
quite possibly after having been given a medical check-up, and if they
were sent back in their own skiff, they might even be given additional
fuel to ensure they returned safely. To say they felt contempt for such
weakness would not overstate their reaction.
What they could also count on was that most ships were too
slow or low in the water to defend or took inadequate self-protection
measures. Despite the fact that the CGPCS Working Group 3 has been
pushing hard, progress has been confined largely to well-run ships
working for well-managed international ship operators. The bulk of
higher risk, lower-standard and local shipping has taken few, if any,
additional precautions.44
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Because Somali pirates aim to take control of ships in order to
capture their crews, their boarding tactics are markedly different from
those practiced elsewhere. Pirates in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore were interested mainly in stealing money from the ship’s
safe and the personal property of crew members; they boarded their
targets surreptitiously and often left them without being discovered. If
they were discovered, or needed to threaten the crew to obtain what
they wanted, they used knives and machetes rather than guns. In cases
such as those of the Petro Ranger in 1998 and the Alondra Rainbow in
1999, where the intention was to steal the entire ship and its cargo, the
pirates often placed accomplices on board before the ship sailed. Their
job was to keep the raiding party apprised of the ship’s position and
help them get onboard when the time came. The fate of the crew varied
but was never pleasant: in some cases they were killed after they had
served their purpose – this would undoubtedly have been the fate of the
men on the Petro Ranger if the Chinese authorities had not intervened
– and in others, such as the Alondra Rainbow, they were set adrift in
the ship’s own lifeboat to fare as best they could.
Off Somalia, pirates are prepared to make a surreptitious
approach in some cases, but more often make no attempt to disguise
their intentions. In some cases, such as the Maersk Alabama, discussed
below, they issue a demand for a ship to stop. In others, they simply
come alongside or circle the ship showing their weapons. If these
warnings go unheeded, where once they fired in the air or across the
ship’s bows, they will now fire on the accommodation block with AK47s and sometimes RPGs until it does. Speed has become important
because pirates need to prevent ships’ crews from retreating into
citadels, or fortified rooms, which take time to break down. The
probability is that the gangs will begin to use plastic explosive, a safer
and effective alternative. They use disguise and deception insofar that
their mother ships are fishing craft, dhows or small freighters; when
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they deploy, potential victims remain ignorant of an attack until pirates’
skiffs are heading toward them.
It is a mistake to think of mother ships as a recent innovation;
pirates have used them almost from the outset of piracy in the 1990s.
Before late 2010, this usually meant forcing a small dhow or fishing
vessel into serving as a base from which to launch attacks on larger
vessels, often before letting it and its crew go once it had served its
purpose (see the case of the Bonsella below).45 The innovation in late
2010 was to use these much larger prizes with their crews on board as
human shields, defying the navies to attack them. The increased size of
these vessels also meant they could stay at sea longer, range
transoceanically and carry a larger complement of pirates to defend the
ship and overwhelm new prizes. It is therefore arguable that the more
aggressive naval tactics initiated an action-reaction cycle that, instead
of intimidating the pirates into inactivity, exposed existing hostages to
new peril and increased the risk to seafarers on ships under attack and
too isolated from naval protection to prevent pirates getting on board.
When confronted by armed teams, pirates have in the main
moved on in search of less well-defended prey. It seems likely that at
some stage they will seek to overcome armed defenses, probably at first
through the use of superior numbers – who can collectively deliver
superior fire-power – deployed from more skiffs, thus forcing
defenders to engage multiple, fast-moving targets. Concern was
expressed in 2011 that pirates would continue to use large captured
freighters as mother ships, which they would equip with tripodmounted heavy weapons and maneuver into a position where they
could fire down onto a target. However, this concern appears to have
receded. Pirates seem to have decide that the greater anonymity offered
by dhows is preferable to using the larger ships, which although
offering greater carrying capacity and greater stability as firing
platforms also have a greater signature and are therefore easier to track
using aerial or space-based sensors. If the number of surveillance assets
45
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in theatre are reduced in line with reductions in naval hull numbers,
then, in the absence of any political strategy to defeat pirates on land,
we might see pirates returning to the use of large ships, a move that will
enable them to engage and quite possibly overcome even highly trained
armed protective teams.
E. Operational Analysis
Although the UN described incidents between fishing vessels
and pirates in the waters around Puntland in the later 1990s and early
2000s as being like a war, until very recently no cargo ships have
repulsed attacks using gunfire. Since then, security details have opined
that warning shots could prove helpful without admitting anything.
Again, until very recently, what kinetic action took place was
largely one-way: outbound from naval ships towards pirate vessels with
nothing but wild shooting in return. There have been nine main
incidents, discussed below.
Incident Involving the USS Cape St. George and the USS Gonzalez
This incident (christened subsequently the “thousand-round
incident”) took place in March 2006 between two US Navy ships, one a
cruiser and the other a destroyer, and a Somali vessel towing two or
three skiffs about 25nm (46km) off the coast. As this vessel-skiff
combination was one of the few reliable indications of possible pirate
activity, the vessel was ordered to stop. Those on board were seen to be
armed with rifles and RPGs and when they reportedly fired on the US
warships, fire was returned, leaving one pirate dead and their vessel
burning. The pirates’ aggression might have been the product of the
ingrained refusal on the part of some Somali males to be intimidated
even by manifestly superior force, reinforced by a lack of prudence
induced by khat consumption. As was often the case, the survivors
claimed to be protecting fishermen. They subsequently were freed
when the US decided not to pursue the case.
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French SOF Raids
French SOF have mounted one raid and two hostage rescues.
The raid, which was mounted pursuant to the Le Ponant release in
February 2008, has been described above. In August 2008 a yacht
under pirate control on its way to Eyl, the Carre d’As, was stormed by
30 men from Commando Hubert, a French SOF unit modelled on the
US SEALs and Britain’s SBS. The 60-year old couple held on board
were freed, one pirate killed, and three captured. The pirates were
reportedly demanding a ransom of $1 million as well as freedom for the
six men captured during the Le Ponant raid. The rescue was mounted
from the Coubert (F712), a La Fayette-class frigate operating outside
Somali territorial waters that had been shadowing the yacht for ten
days, supported by a maritime reconaissance aircraft. Germany and
Indonesia, both contributors to CTF-150 at the time, provided
unspecified assistance.46 Rather less successful was the commando raid
mounted in April 2009 to free a couple and their child held hostage
aboard their yacht the Tanit. The commandos approached the yacht in
rubber boats from two directions, and the pirates opened fire as soon as
the raid was spotted. Two pirates and the child’s father, Florent
Lemaçon, were killed and the surviving pirates captured. Chloé
Lemaçon and the child were rescued unharmed. It was revealed later
that her husband may have been killed in the cross-fire.47
HMS Cumberland
In November 2008 a Danish-registered cargo ship, the MV
Powerful, was fired on by pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The pirates’
vessel, a hijacked Yemeni dhow, was intercepted by HMS Cumberland
60nm off the Yemeni coast, and a Royal Marine boarding party
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approached the pirate vessel. The mixed group of Somali and Yemeni
pirates on board opened fire on the Marines and in the ensuing
exchange two Somalis were killed. Another man, believed to be
Yemeni, was found dead onboard, although it was unclear whether he
was killed in the exchange of gunfire or had been shot earlier and died
of his wounds.
Maersk Alabama
On April 8, 2009, the 1,100-TEU container ship the Maersk
Alabama, part of the US Maritime Security Program, was hijacked
400nm (741km) east of Mogadishu with US nationals and a USAid
cargo of food supplies on board, on a regular run from Djibouti to
Mombasa, Kenya. Following a prepared plan, the crew stopped the
engines and retreated to a citadel below decks from where they could
steer the ship. Using this as a base, they engaged the pirates in a fivehour struggle that included steering the ship in a manner that swamped
the pirates’ boat, stranding them on board. In the confusion, one pirate
became separated from the rest of the gang and was taken prisoner by
the crew. The remaining pirates retreated over the side to the ship’s
lifeboat, but failed to start its engine. Richard Phillips, the Maersk
Alabama’s captain, accompanied by the captured pirate, entered the
lifeboat to help them. At this point, the pirates reneged on whatever
deal had been agreed, taking the captain hostage. The crew
immediately began to negotiate with the pirates in the lifeboat.
A P-3 maritime patrol aircraft was monitoring the situation
from the air, and the nearest US warship, the USS Bainbridge, which
had been 300nm (556km) away at the start of the incident, arrived on
the scene on April 9. Other ships joined the USS Bainbridge, including
the guided-missile frigate USS Halyburton and an amphibious assault
ship the USS Boxer. They interposed their hulls between the lifeboat
and the Somali coast, plied it with high-pressure hoses, and positioned
a helicopter immediately above to engulf it in its powerful downdraft.
After the pirate leader sustained an injury and requested medical
assistance, he was taken on board the Bainbridge. The navy’s harassing
tactics wore the remaining pirates down and wasted the craft’s fuel
47
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until it was dead in the water. After venting their frustration by firing
on the US ships with AK-47s, they requested food and water. This
request was granted. Without power, the lifeboat could only drift and in
the rough sea was moving violently. At this point, they demanded that
the US Navy tow them to Somalia.
A line was put in place but, instead of heading for the coast, the
Navy gradually brought the lifeboat closer to the Bainbridge’s fantail
and within range of SEAL snipers. Given permission to fire if they
believed Captain’s Phillip’s life was in danger, the snipers did so on
April 12, killing three pirates and ending a 96-hour standoff. The pirate
who had been taken on board the Bainbridge was flown to New York
for trial and on February 16, 2011, was sentenced to 33 years and 9
months in prison.
Quest
The Quest was a small yacht, home to Scott and Jean Adams,
two Americans who were sailing it around the world, and Phyllis
Mackay and Bob Riggle, friends who had joined them for the voyage
across the northern Arabian Sea. In February 2011, it was hijacked by
pirates off the coast of Oman. The Americans knew they were entering
pirate-populated waters and had joined up with a sail race called the
Blue Water Rally, which offered them protection in numbers. On
February 15, however, they broke away from the group and headed
towards the Omani coast for reasons that are not understood.48 There is
some suggestion that they might have been experiencing some
mechanical problems. Alternatively, they may have felt they were close
enough to Oman to make the relatively short journey alone. Whatever
their reasoning, it was a mistake.
Nineteen pirates boarded the yacht and began to sail it slowly
back to Somalia. It was intercepted by the USS Sterett, a guided-missile
destroyer about 150nm off Cape Guardafui. Two pirates agreed to be
taken on board the Sterett to negotiate. When the FBI negotiators
decided the men were not acting in good faith, they detained them and
48
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told the men on board the yacht to send someone who could talk
seriously. Unfortunately, the pirates may have pondered the fate of the
Maersk Alabama hostage takers; only a week before, a 33-year
sentence had been handed down to the one pirate who had survived.
Young and inexperienced, possibly high on khat and now leaderless,
with one US warship less than half a mile away and three more in sight,
including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the USS Enterprise, the
pirates attempted to contact their bosses in Puntland.
The details of what happened next is the subject of an
investigation. Shots rang out, not from a naval vessel towards the
pirates, but on board the hijacked yacht. A RPG round was then fired at
the USS Sterett, possibly in the same desperate spirit. Thirteen pirates
seemed to recognize their plight and came on deck with their hands
raised. Navy SEALS, whose speedy arrival suggests they were ready to
make an assault long before the shooting began, arrived to find two
more pirates dead and two more in hiding. They shot one and killed the
second in a close-quarters knife fight. The four Americans, who they
had come to save, lay shot and dying.49
Serious questions have been raised about the strategy followed
by the FBI hostage negotiating team; in particular, whether it was
prudent to separate the pirates from their immediate leaders by
detaining them on board the Sterett and, it has been suggested, cutting
their link to their senior leaders ashore. That these links were being
monitored can be assumed from the fact that the on-land negotiator was
picked up later and spirited back to the US for trial.50
Defiant statements from pirates after they have experienced
violent setbacks have become common. Threats to attack both French
and American ships were issued after the Le Ponant and Maersk
Alabama incidents, but nothing came of them. However, the threats
issued after the Quest may have signaled a new attitude toward
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hostages. In particular, a pirate named Muse Abdi said that killing
hostages “has now become part of our rules,” while another told
reporters only minutes before the killings took place that “the hostages
will be the first to go.” Ominously, another pirate who gave his name as
Bile Hussain said it was a “black day for us and also the Americans, but
they lost bigger than us.”51 To what degree this was bravado, words
calculated carefully to resonate with Western values and Western fears,
or a real change of attitude will only be revealed over time. However,
pirate attitudes toward hostages did appear to be changing, with those
from states that had taken violent action against them being singled out
for special treatment.
Comparisons can be invidious, yet nonetheless reflect real
differences. The reticence with which the members of the various
Western coalitions – CTF-151, NATO, and the EU—have used
violence stands in contrast with other states that have chosen to keep
their forces under national control. There also appears to be a greater
willingness on the part of pirates to stand and fight. A few examples are
worth highlighting.
Russia
Somali pirates hijacked an oil tanker named the Moscow
University off the Yemimi coast in May 2010. Russian naval forces
aboard the warship Marshal Shaposhidov were accused of setting the
hijackers adrift with little or no means of returning to the coast safely,
or of killing them by placing their bodies aboard their own boat and
then blowing it up. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the pirates
ashore appeared to take the charges seriously and threatened a tit-for-tat
response. A Russian spokesman denied the allegations categorically,
saying that they had returned the pirates to their boat but had given then
adequate supplies and had not intended to kill them.52
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South Korea
On January 15, 2011, the MV Samho Jewelry was pirated
approximately 350nm southeast of Muscat, Oman. The 20,000tonne product tanker was carrying chemicals. It was Maltese-flagged,
Norwegian-owned, and had a crew of 21 drawn from South Korea,
Burma, and Indonesia. It was the second Samho Shipping Company
ship to be hijacked; the Samho Dream, a VLCC with $170 million of
crude oil aboard, had been hijacked in April 2010 and was not released
until November, for what was then a record ransom of $9.5 million.
The South Korean government was clearly unwilling to see this
repeated. A South Korean destroyer tracked the Samho Jewelry for
several days as the pirates attempted to use it as a mother ship from
which to attack other vessels, ignoring repeated demands that they
surrender. South Korean SOF approached the ship on January 21 and
once aboard confronted the pirates. Three soldiers were wounded, and
the ship’s captain suffered an abdominal wound. The South Korean
military said they had mounted the raid because they believed the
pirates were exhausted after the long standoff, while also admitting that
the battle had lasted five hours. It is perhaps worth noting that the
violent intervention took place after North Koreans had shelled a small
South Korean island in November 2010, and President Lee Myung-bak
had been criticized for his muted reaction.53
India
The incident involving the INS Tabar, which attacked a Thaiowned trawler that was being used as a pirate mother ship in November
2008 even though its crew was still aboard, will be discussed in the
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following section. In February 2011, the Indian Navy cornered another
captured fishing vessel with men from Burma and Thailand aboard that
was being used as a mother ship, in this case close to the Laccadives, a
group of small islands roughly 100 to 240nm off the southwest coast of
the Indian mainland. The 28 pirates on board surrendered after only a
brief exchange of fire and were taken to Bombay for trial.54 Barely a
month later, the Indian Navy attacked another mother ship, the
Mozambique trawler Vega 5, which had been used as a base for several
piracy attempts. The navy approached the ship nearly 700nm off
southern India and was fired upon. Fire was returned, and 61 pirates
together with the original crew jumped into the sea to flee the burning
ship.55 The navy later discovered that 25 of the pirates were under 15
years old and, of these, four were no more than 11.56 As with the Quest,
the pirate organizers in Somalia threatened to take revenge on Indian
seamen: Bile Hussain, the same spokesman as in the Quest case, was
reported as saying that the Indian government must “release our friends
in their hands or else they have to be ready for their citizens to be
mistreated in the near future.”57 Within a month it appeared that the
pirates were prepared to make good on this threat: when the crew of the
UAE-owned Asphalt Venture were released upon payment of ransom
after seven months in captivity, six of the 15 Indian crew members
were held back pending release of pirates captured by the Indian
navy.58
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Indonesia
In March 2011, a group of between 30 and 50 pirates seized an
Indonesian-owned and -flagged bulk carrier, the Sinar Kudus, about
320nm north east of Socotra, a Yemeni island in the Indian Ocean. In
April, Indonesia announced that it had deployed two frigates with 400
embarked marines to protect the ship and crew following its release.
Once the ransom, reputed to be between $3 million and $4.5 million,
was agreed upon and the pirates had left the ship, the Indonesian
marines pursued the pirates, killing four in a firefight.59

III. Counterpiracy
A. Naval Presence
Limited naval anti-piracy operations began in 2006, following
the November 2005 attack on the U.S.-owned cruise liner the Seabourn
Spirit. UN Security Council resolutions made it easier for states to send
warships to the region, and from mid-2008 onwards vessels from the
U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and Pakistan
began to undertake operations. At the beginning, the level of
cooperation was generally rudimentary. Communication between
established allies well-versed in each other’s methods such as the U.S.
and U.K. was close and routine, but other navies found communication
more difficult. Differing rules of engagement also presented problems,
with some states allowing their commanders at sea to take more
decisive action than others. The three missions that were assembled to
deal with Somali piracy reflected these political imperatives.

59

“Indonesia to pick up hostages from Somali pirates,” Agence France-Presse,
16 April 2011; “Indonesian army kills 4 pirates; 20 hostages freed,”
Associated Press, 3 May 2011.
53

Murphy: Piracy

Discussion Questions

1. The key variable in limiting pirate effectiveness appears to be

2.

3.
4.

5.

ship self-protection, not naval deterrence or faster naval
reaction times. What lessons can navies learn from this? How
might it affect their relations with civilian ship owners and
crews?
Some in naval circles have suggested that US reluctance to
engage pirates on land has been based on a calculated
assessments of relevant operational factors; other have
suggested it has been postponed by three words: “Black Hawk
Down.” Which explanation appears to explain the facts best?
What are the implications of independent actors within the task
force structure? What are its advantages and disadvantages?
Apart from counterpiracy efforts, what are other advantages of
ongoing cooperative naval operations? Are these advantages
worthwhile even if the counterpiracy efforts are less than
successful?
What alternative naval force structure might achieve the same
result more economically?

NATO
The NATO mission Operation Allied Provider was the first to
be stood up. It was established to provide close protection for World
Food Program (WFP) aid ships to Somalia in October 2008, following
the hijacking of the cargo ship MV Faina.60 The mission consisted of
four ships drawn from Standing NATO Maritime Group Two
(SNMG2) under the command of Allied Maritime Component
Command Naples and lasted from October 24, 2008 to December 12,
2008.61 The mission was spurred by the concerns expressed about
60
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Somali piracy by several European governments and was intended to
be an interim measure until the EU could stand up its own operation.
Somali pirate activity had interfered with relief operations, and it had
only been possible for them to continue prior to the NATO mission
because France, Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands had each
unilaterally agreed to deploy warships to protect deliveries for a limited
period.
At the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Krakow, Poland in
February 2009, it was decided to extend the mission mandate for an
unspecified period under the designation Operation Allied Protector. It
involved the diversion of Standing NATO Maritime Group One
(SNMG1) when it was on its way to a training exercise in the Far East
and Australia. The deployment commenced in August 2009, with ships
from the U.S., U.K., Greece, Italy, and Turkey controlled from
NATO’s Joint Command Headquarters in Lisbon.
In August 2009, Operation Allied Protector was replaced by
Operation Ocean Shield under the command of SNMG2. The mission’s
stated aim was to bring “a distinctive NATO role based on the broad
strength of the Alliance by adopting a more comprehensive approach to
counter-piracy efforts”; the specific intention was to help local states
build the capacity to combat piracy activities with minimal external
assistance, in order to create a “lasting maritime security solution off
the Horn of Africa.”62
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EU NAVFOR
The EU mission was announced in October 2008. When it was
stood up in December 2008 as EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, it
became the second piracy-specific international mission to be deployed
in Somali waters.63 Like the NATO mission, it consisted of seven
warships drawn from France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and
Spain, supported by contributions from Portugal, Sweden, and non-EU
member Norway, operating under British command from the
Permanent Joint Headquarters facility at Northwood, just outside
London. It was intended to replace the NATO mission with “no voids
and no duplication.”64 Both Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s SecretaryGeneral, and Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common
Foreign and Security Policy, stressed the need for cooperation. As part
of its effort, EU NAVFOR also established the Maritime Security
Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA), an online reporting center for
shipping transiting the region, which provided a useful website that
supplemented existing reporting centers provided by the U.K.
(Maritime Trade Office, Dubai) and the U.S. (Maritime Liaison Office,
Bahrain). In June 2009, the EU Council agreed to extend the
operation’s mandate for a further year until December 2010. It was
renewed again, taking authorization through to 2014.
The deployment of the NATO and EU NAVFOR forces gave
the impression that the missions had as much, if not more, to do with
demonstrating the effectiveness of two essentially competitive
organizations than with finding solutions to Somali piracy. The EU
mission also effectively advanced its claim to a role in foreign and
security affairs that was separate and above those of its member states.
In July 2009, the EU declared that like NATO it would become
involved in capacity building by sending a mission to train the TFG’s
newly created anti-piracy force. In March 2010, the EU went further
when it announced it would shift at least some of its attention away
from the protection of WFP ships in order to disrupt the operations of
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the pirates’ mother ships as the waters calmed down at the end of the
northeast monsoon season.65 This resulted in the “full court press”
operation mentioned previously, which between October and
November 2010 spread out 14 EU ships along the Somali coast at
50nm intervals, each one positioned between five and 30 miles
offshore, to interdict pirate ships departing the coast. The response of
the pirates was, as described, to deploy mother ships with hostages
aboard.
CTF-151
The third cooperative mission, Combined Task Force (CTF)
151, was established in January 2009 by the U.S. Navy. It was a spinoff from CTF-150, which had been established in 2001 as part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OAF) to track possible al Qaeda and
related movements between Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. To
accomplish this counterterrorism mission, CFT-150 usually deployed
about 14 warships and a supply vessel to cover 2.5 million square miles
of ocean, not just off Somalia but also the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian
Sea, the Red Sea and large parts of the Indian Ocean. CTF-150 only
became involved in counter-piracy operations following the 2005
attack on the Seabourn Spirit. Senior U.S. naval commanders have
consistently been concerned that this supplementary activity has been a
distraction from what continued to be its primary mission. Equally,
some states, particularly Germany, which were reluctant to tackle
piracy as part of an OAF-related mission, found it much easier to join a
coalition effort that was more clearly differentiated.
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Forces Under National Control
In order to avoid placing allied officers commanding CTF-150
in difficult positions politically, the U.S. Navy sometimes placed its
own ships under national control. The USS Winston S. Churchill, for
example, was operating under national control when it apprehended
pirates in January 2006. The announcement that NATO would be
sending a standing force into the Indian Ocean for the first time in its
history spurred a number of other nations to send warships to the
region. In October 2008, Russia, some of whose citizens had been
seized by pirates when the Svitzer Korsakov and Faina were hijacked,
issued a statement saying it would be sending a warship with support
craft to the region that would cooperate with US and EU forces. In
December 2008, China announced it would be sending a task force
consisting of two destroyers and a supply ship after a Chinese-flagged
vessel, the Zhenhua 4, fought off an attack in the Gulf of Aden. In
January 2009, Japan announced it would make a similar commitment
despite the pacifist clauses in its constitution; two destroyers arrived in
the area in March and were replaced in July by two others that had been
issued with what were described as “expanded rules of engagement.”
India had announced in October 2008 that it would send ships
to guard Indian-flagged vessels and Indian seamen who had come
under attack and been held hostage; it was exercised particularly by the
September 2008 seizure of the MT Stolt Valor with 18 Indian nationals
on board. That November, the INS Tabar fired on what was described
as a suspect pirate vessel. However, it turned out to be the Ekawat Nava
5, a Thai fishing vessel that had been hijacked by pirates for use as a
mother ship with the original crew still on board. The pirates reportedly
opened fire that the Tabar returned, causing explosions on board that
the Indian Navy ascribed to exploding ammunition. There were no
reports that the Indian ship stopped to pick up survivors.66 According to
the only fisherman to come through the ordeal, he and all but two of the
hijacked crew were tied up on deck when the attack started. He
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managed to escape overboard and drifted at sea for six days before
being rescued and taken to Yemen. Although forceful action against
pirates is frequently justified and often required, this incident illustrates
how necessary it is to acquire as accurate a picture as possible of the
potential situation prior to any engagement, and that when hostages are
involved, their lives are often more at risk than the pirates’.
Other states that sent warships to the region at various times
include Australia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and
South Korea. As a consequence of the coalition naval initiatives and the
contributions made by states on an individual basis, the number of
warships involved in anti-piracy operations in the region, always a
figure that was hard to pin down because of the frequent transfers in
and out of the area of operations, varied around the 30 ship mark.

B. Challenges
Pirate groups have always aimed to make money. They have no
other agenda. They do not engage in piracy to advance clan or other
political interests, nor do they support terrorist causes. If money passed
from pirates to Islamists, it was paid to keep them off their backs, as it
was paid to political and clan figures elsewhere.
The attitude of militant Islamist groups appears to be more
opaque. Publically, they say that piracy is “un-Islamic” and that they
will stamp it out. Hizbul Islam took a similar position in 2009, saying
that if they found the Chandlers they would release them unharmed.
Groups that may have been part of Hizbul Islam, were ex-Hizbul Islam,
or conceivably al-Shabaab, on the other hand, appeared willing to take
what they could from pirates by threatening to disrupt their operations
unless they paid what amounted to protection money. There have also
been unconfirmed reports that pirates have operated out of the southern
al-Shabaab-controlled port of Kismayo or at least obtained supplies
from there. If true, this suggests some connivance in their activities but
not necessarily any direct engagement.
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Discussion Questions

1. There is evidence that some Somali pirates have aided the al-

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. Does this justify using
counterterrorism measures against the pirates?
If an alliance between Somali pirates and al-Qaeda were to
expand, would this trigger a more pronounced response from
the United States? Would this threat of greater US action deter
a pirate/al-Qaeda affiliation?
What economic alternatives to piracy exist currently? How
could these be developed and new opportunities started to the
point that would offer a viable option to piracy? What political
and security measures would need to be enacted to making
these developments sustainable?
What actions could be taken against the financial interests of
pirate organizers and their clan patrons, either directly or
indirectly, in Somalia or abroad?
Is China’s involvement in counter-piracy operations a positive
or negative from the U.S. perspective?
What actions could be taken against the financial interests of
pirate organizers and their patrons, either directly or indirectly?
Has the counter-piracy operations of Somalia exposed flaws in
maritime domain awareness? If so, can those flaws be
corrected? How?

Piracy has historically been a crime with a strong political
dimension. Although most local and regional naval commanders placed
the safety of seafarers and the suppression of pirate activity at the
center of their mission, many foreign and defense ministries back home
ensured from the outset that political considerations overshadowed
their efforts. This was demonstrated most obviously in their preference
for “catch and release” over capture and prosecution.
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However, it also extended to the suspicion that several navies
were using piracy operations as a way of gaining credibility on the
international stage. China and Russia in particular were using the
deployment to learn (or re-learn) the practicalities of transoceanic
operations and to observe how navies that were already well-versed in
such operations, such as those of the US, the UK, and France, managed
their activities. The consequent concern was that if this experience
proved successful, the Chinese in particular might be encouraged to
expand their power projection capability—that the lasting consequence
of Somali piracy might be that it gave new navies the operational
experience they needed to accelerate their development. If this might be
the eventual outcome, it would be eventually unavoidable. Openhanded engagement in the meantime could prompt China to become a
positive player in international maritime security, fulfilling the
constructive role that its economic power and international trading
interests warranted, which is what the US Navy was hoping to foster.
There is also a lack of mutual appreciation between the navies
and the merchant marines, verging on distrust. Whatever the ultimate
reasons for their presence, the navies do try to counter piracy as
effectively as they can. They are, however, woefully short on ship
numbers and subject to rules of engagement (ROE) that restrict what
they can do. Spyros Polemis, the chairman of the International
Chamber of Shipping, described the “current military response,” for
which “only a handful of navy ships” were available to provide
protection on any given day, as amounting to no more that a “sticking
plaster on a gaping wound,” and charged that governments had “failed
to protect shipping, and the smooth flow of world trade, from being
literally held to ransom by Somali criminals.”67 They have therefore
urged merchant ships to adopt more and more vigorous self-protection
measures and have begun to imply that vessels that do not do so are at
fault if and when they are attacked and captured.
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However, when they check in with MSC-HOA, ships that
admit that they have an armed protection detachment on board are
regarded as being at less risk that those without and are therefore
accorded a lower protection status. This assessment might be fair, but it
also encourages ships to be less than honest about their true status.
While sensible measures have proved effective at deterring pirates, who
to date have chosen the easiest available targets, a tone has entered the
discourse reminiscent of that voiced by underresourced and ineffective
police departments who blame householders for being robbed rather
than their own low standards of law enforcement. Some commentators
have taken a similar line, suggesting that as ship owners have sought to
register their ships with flags that offer the most appropriate balance of
tax regimen and technical standards, they are somehow avoiding their
responsibilities and, consequently, have no right to call for help. Lax
and irresponsible ship owners of course exist, but there are just as
many, if not more, ship owners who cannot attain the highest operating
standards yet strive to operate within the law. International shipping is
a cost-sensitive business; it has achieved historically unparalleled levels
of efficiency, which has made the cost of marine transport a negligible
proportion of the unit cost of most products and raw materials shipped
by sea. The demand that ships increase their level of self-protection,
and even embark armed guards, reverses the progress that began 200
years ago with the disarming of merchant vessels in peacetime as the
piracy threat declined. Merchant mariners increasingly take the views –
rarely expressed in public – either that navies have become so
preoccupied with power projection that they are no longer attuned to
trade protection and have therefore become blind to the threat the
Somali pirates represent, or, more mundanely, that if navies are underprepared or under-equipped for the trade protection mission, shipping
companies should not be expected to pay taxes and pay what it takes to
protect their ships themselves. It is a milder version of Hastings’
judgment on the Royal Navy’s impotence with the Chandlers’
abduction: if navies cannot defend national interests and their own
citizens on the high seas, it becomes hard to see what they exist for.
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To condemn the navies alone, however, would be unjust. States
have always been reluctant to take action against pirates. The reasons
and the evasions given to explain this lack of resolve naturally vary
from case to case, but the underlying justification is largely consistent:
short of a larger political imperative, piracy’s political and economic
costs are too insignificant to warrant taking action. This reluctance has
been in display off Somalia and resulted in naval action that has been
hesitant, has relied on rudimentary coordination, and has often been
self-serving. Resolution of coordination issues between the various
multinational naval task forces and ships from countries such as China,
Russia, Japan, and India, which remained under national control,
awaited the introduction of a process known as Shared Awareness and
Deconfliction (SHADE) in October 2009.
Hesitancy and poor coordination can be seen at work in the
Chandler’s case. The ROE under which the Wave Knight operated
contributed to the lack of effective action, while the apparent delay in
dispatching the SBS team from the UK meant it arrived in theatre too
late to affect the outcome. Viewed more generally, many states
instructed their navies not to detain pirates if they caught them at sea,
even if they were in possession of incriminating paraphernalia.
The three most important practical benefits of the naval
presence were (1) to complicate the operating picture for the pirates,
and, (2) when they were sufficiently close to an incident to be able to
react in time, either force the pirates to break off their attack or (3)
capture them, when enough navies had modified their rules to
engagement to permit this. To enhance their chances of success and to
decrease the pirates’ options, the US Navy, working with its Coalition
partners in CTF-150 and the IMO, established a maritime security
patrol area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden in July 2008 with eastbound
and westbound Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors
(IRTCs).68 This extended for 464 nm (860 km) along the Yemeni coast,
from a point just west of the Bab al-Mandeb to a point roughly north of
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Socotra.69 In February 2009, the patrol area was moved a short distance
further away from the Yemeni coast in an attempt to prevent pirates
from hiding among Yemeni fishing craft, and the coordinates changed
again in September 2009.70 The intention was not to convoy ships, but
to group them together for greater safety and to space them in ways that
would optimize a warship’s chances of reaching them, usually with its
helicopter, before pirates had taken control.71
What it failed to do was to stop piracy. In their statistical study,
Percy and Shortland conclude that naval action had a clear deterrent
effect, but that this lasted only a short time. If a naval vessel succeeded
in disrupting an attack but the pirates escaped, another attack would
take place in the same area between 24 and 48 hours later. The danger
period in the Somali Basin remained high for 24 to 96 hours.72
However, while their figures are similar to those generated by ONI, the
explanation that deterrence is responsible is doubtful. Starting in 2009,
ONI issued a warning after every credibly reported failed attack that
another was probable within 48 hours or 50 nm.
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In fact, the whole notion of naval deterrence is questionable.
While it was true that the pirates found it harder to succeed as a
consequence of the introduction and refinement of the IRTCs, more
naval patrols, and the improved self-protection measures taken by
merchant ships, these all came along at more or less the same time,
making it difficult to determine which had the greater effect. It was
reasonable to assume that better self-protection measures at least
bought time for naval forces to move close enough to be able to
respond when merchant ships were under attack. Given that pirate
success rates dropped off in the Indian Ocean, where the IRTCs did not
exist and naval protection was largely absent (although admittedly not
to the same degree as in the Gulf of Aden), however, improved selfprotective measures appeared to be a key variable, not deterrence or
faster naval reaction times. If this conclusion is true, then the
justification for a continuing naval presence as constituted currently
must be open to doubt, as must be the assertion that it will bring piracy
to an end.
Neither can the cost of this presence be ignored. The annual
cost of maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden-Horn of
Africa region is estimated at over $1.82 billion, based on an average
daily availability of 29 ships dedicated to counter-piracy operations.. It
is hard to justify this solely on the basis of preventing pirates snatching
between $40 million and $80 million in ransoms. Much larger figures
to cover all losses have thus been suggested based on a poorly defined
list that includes items such as additional fuel, loss of fees for transiting
the Suez Canal, and added insurance premiums. Calculating how much
is lost to piracy worldwide has produced a range of figures over the
years, none of which have any empirical foundation.73
In truth, piracy is less economically harmful today than it was
in the past. A recent study suggests that, taking all possible categories
of loss into account, piracy costs the world economy between $7 billion
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and $12 billion a year.74 In the context of world trade measured in
trillions of dollars, this amounts to little more than a rounding error.
Stephen Carmel has pointed out that the Barbary pirates “had a moreor-less established rate for ransom of roughly $4,000 per person. Today
that would be roughly $1.5 million per person, which would translate to
a total ship ransom in the range of $29 million – not the $2.1 million
the Somali pirates averaged per ship in 2009.”75 Given the historically
demonstrable link between piracy and economics, it comes as no
surprise that without clear proof that the cost of an outbreak is placing
an intolerable burden on their interests, states have felt free to take little
or no action against it, although such calculations take no account of
the loss or death of seafarers and the misery inflicted on their families.
The question marks that hang over navies’ ability to suppress
piracy are hardly surprising: there were never enough warships to
effectively cover the pirates’ operating areas in the Gulf of Aden and
Indian Ocean, which extended over two and a half million square miles
of open sea – roughly the size of Western Europe from the coast of
Portugal to the borders of Russia - traversed every year by 30,000
commercial vessels on average.76 A number of navies, the US Navy in
particular, repeatedly made the point that stopping piracy was not an
outcome they could bring about.77 History was on their side: piracy has
never been defeated unless its sponsors on land have been arrested,
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defeated, bribed, or agreed to a political settlement based on a
combination of these elements.
In late 2007, perhaps with this knowledge in mind, the US Fifth
Fleet suggested that US Marines should conduct a simultaneous raid on
all the known piracy bases. Even though the goal would have been to
destroy boats and infrastructure, not to kill or capture pirates, the
request was denied. It was stopped by the use of three short words:
“Black Hawk down.” The decision appears a poor one in retrospect, as
pirate activity, and pirate profits, reached new heights in the months
that followed. A strike at that point could have been psychologically
decisive. But piracy is inseparable from politics, something that is as
true in Somalia as it has been elsewhere. The decision not to proceed
would have been redeemed had decisive political action been initiated
instead. It was not. The Bush administration again floated the idea of
coastal raids in late 2008 but this time, given greater international
presence, felt the need to win the support of its partners. They
responded coolly. The deciding factor, however, was that the
intelligence agencies were unable to supply sufficiently accurate
information to make the raids worthwhile.78
Somalis are suspicious of strangers. Foreigners stand out. This
makes intelligence difficult to gather, but not impossible. The US
preference for technical collection methods would appear to be the
optimal solution. Pirate bases or encampments, insofar as they exist, are
readily identifiable from the air. However, finding and locating bases
that as a matter of policy cannot be attacked adds little to an
understanding of pirate operations. Moreover, although pirate ships – or
Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) as the navies for some unfathomable
reason want to call them – can be tracked as they depart Somalia, this is
not enough. They need to be tracked continuously as they move into the
Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and this does not appear to be happening
to the extent necessary. It can be done using commercially available
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surveillance approach radar and optical surveillance systems; the cost is
high but not, relatively speaking, exorbitant. The question remains,
nonetheless, who will pay? More importantly, an understanding of
pirate dynamics ashore needs to be developed, together with the
identity and practices of pirate leaders and financiers. Somalia has a
sophisticated cell phone network that can be tapped by vessels
patrolling offshore and from space, but any information harvested from
this source needs to be assessed by someone familiar with neurolinguistic programming and Somali culture to determine truth from
deception. People with both sets of skills are available, although they
appear to be woefully underemployed. In addition, the US focus on
countering terrorism appears to have meant that few, if any, contacts
have been fostered among pirate groups or those familiar with their
operations. Yet these people too are not hard to find.

C. Lack of Political Engagement
In contrast with historical experience, the current approach is
characterized by a lack of policy engagement, an overreliance on naval
patrols, and an overconcentration on judicial solutions. The
international response has also suffered from weak or nonexistent
strategic communications, arguably the result of unclear policy
direction.
Discussion Questions

1. The naval operation off Somali can be regarded as a failure
compared to the naval operations of Bosnia, Iraq and East
Timor. Why?

2. What is the role of Special Operations Forces in contending
with piracy?

3. What factors make the maritime aspects of piracy difficult to
deal with?
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4. Are civilian casualties – either among the Somali population or
the hostages – justified if it brought piracy to an end? If so,
what level of casualties would be acceptable, and how could
the policy to be sold to key constituencies, e.g., seafarers’
families?

The root cause of these problems has been widespread
international indifference to the fate of Somalia post-1995 when the last
UN forces left the country. American indifference has been driven
largely by the horrific outcome of the battle of Mogadishu in 1993,
which has reportedly paralyzed more than one policy initiative,
including proposed raids against piracy encampments. American
reluctance to become involved in Somalia – above and beyond the bare
minimum needed to hunt down the perpetrators of the 1998 East
African embassy bombings – has been cemented by the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, which have consumed national resources, political
reputations and official attention at an alarming rate.
Apart from the need to respond to the occasional high-profile
incident – for the US the hijacking of the Maerk Alabama, for the
French the Le Ponant, and for the British the predicament of the
Chandlers (although its response was noticeably low-key following the
navy’s initial failures) – policy and its implementation across all states
have largely failed to involve the highest level of government. Powers
have been content to engage with Somalia though the medium of the
United Nations and its agencies such as FAO, the IMO, and the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The consequence has been
continuing support for the TFG, the ineffective central government, a
continuing refusal to grant international recognition to Somaliland, only
half-hearted attempts to deal constructively with the admittedly
untrustworthy political leaders of Puntland, and the development of
various international initiatives of which the most prominent have been
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the
Djibouti Code of Conduct.
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The CGPCS was created on January 14, 2009, in response to
UNSC 1851. It is described as a “voluntary, ad-hoc forum” at which
nearly 60 states and organizations—including the African Union, the
EU, NATO, and various UN bodies—and representatives of the
maritime-related industries such as shipping and insurance can
coordinate political, naval, and other responses to Somali-based piracy.
It has five working groups that meet regularly at various locations
around the world: Military and Operational Coordination, Information
Sharing, and Capacity Building, chaired by the United Kingdom;
Judicial Issues, chaired by Denmark; Strengthening Shipping SelfAwareness and Other Capabilities, chaired by the United States; Public
Information, chaired by Egypt; and Tracking Illicit Financial Flows,
chaired by Italy.79
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (or, to give it is full title, the
Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the
Gulf of Aden) was signed on January 29, 2009 by nine regional states.
A further eight have signed subsequently, bringing the total to 17 out of
the 21 eligible to accede. The signatories have agreed to co-operate to
advance:
 The investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons or people
suspected of perpetrating or aiding piracy;
 The interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and equipment;
 The rescue of ships, persons, and property subject to piracy and
armed robbery; and
 The conduct of shared operations such as the provision of
“shipriders,” i.e., law enforcement officials embarked on the naval
vessels of another signatory.
In addition, the Code provides for information sharing. To
facilitate this, it has enabled construction of three new centers: two
dedicated to rescue coordination in Mombasa, Kenya and
79
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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (a sub-center) and one dedicated to maritime
information in Sana’a, Yemen. Other aspects of the Code cover the
implementation of adequate anti-piracy legislation and the provision of
support and assistance by extra-regional powers.80
Both initiatives reflect an international aspiration to replicate
off of the coast of Somalia what is seen as a successful institutional
solution to piracy in Southeast Asia, even though the two situations
differ markedly. Until the recent rise in Somali piracy, Indonesia was
the most pirate-prone nation on Earth. Most piracy in the Strait of
Malacca originated in Indonesia. For reasons outsiders need not agree
with but can understand, Indonesia did not place a high political
priority on piracy suppression and greatly resented the international
criticism that flowed from this decision. Japan made persistent efforts
to cajole Indonesia and other littoral states in the region to take firmer
action. By 2001, Tokyo had secured agreement for the establishment of
ReCAAP (the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) but substantial action was
not undertaken until after the US proposed the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004 and the Joint War Committee of
Lloyd’s of London designated parts of the Malacca Strait a war zone
for insurance purposes in 2005.81 It was these two pressures – the
suggestion that the United States would deploy naval forces and
Marines to the Straits to deal with the problem unilaterally, and the
imposition by Lloyd’s of an economic cost that the littoral states could
not disguise, manipulate, or ignore – that prompted Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia to take action jointly to head off unacceptable
international interference and to breathe effective life into ReCAAP’s
cooperative procedures. Several other factors had arguably greater
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impact, of which the most significant probably was the Chinese
government’s 1998 clampdown on internal corruption that closed the
market for pirated goods in southern China.
The critical point is that the littoral states of Southeast Asia had
functioning governments that were open to international persuasion and
assistance and could take steps of varying effectiveness to address the
piracy problem. They were reasonable interlocutors, whose existence
meant maritime states could work with littoral states that responded to
political pressure and financial inducement.
The situation in the Horn of Africa is not comparable. Somalia
is a failed state. The other states in the region have varying levels of
governmental competence, but all lack the economic resources to tackle
the problem. Regional consultative mechanisms are weakened by local
rivalries, most particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both of which
have interfered in Somalia’s domestic politics in pursuit of their own
interests. The larger regional players, the AU and the Arab League, are
interested in the political problem of Somalia but have little interest in
piracy. There is a chance that a rising sense of alarm among members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) triggered by pirate attacks on
shipping heading for or departing the Arabian Gulf might presage a
change of attitudes in the wider region. Among international
institutions, the UN, the EU, and NATO have engaged in pirate
suppression with varying degrees of effectiveness and understanding.
The insurance industry raised rates for shipping in the Gulf of Aden,
but this did not have the effect it had in Southeast Asia with
governments that were sensitive to increases in business costs and to
the impression that they were unable to control their own territory.
One final diplomatic effort need to be mentioned: the Somali
contact group on counter-piracy, also known as the Kampala Process.
This was established in January 2010 in response to a request by
Working Group 1 of the CGPCS for a venue where counter-piracy
information generation and sharing discussions and negotiations could
take place between the TFG, Puntland, and Somaliland, and where their
counter-piracy efforts could be coordinated. The United Nations
Political Office for Somalia (UNOPS), based in Hargeisa, Somaliland,
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provides secretariat functions to support the drafting of new anti-piracy
laws to be enacted by each of the participants.82
D. Three Representative Incidents
The examples of the Bonsella, the Golden Nori, and the Le
Ponant exemplify these difficulties and strained allegiances.

Map 3: Somalian Piracy Threat Map, 2005-2010
Bonsella: A Pirate Attack in the 1990s
On September 9, 1994, the M.V. Bonsella, a small merchant
ship carrying emergency aid to Somalia, was approached by a dhow
three miles off Caluula, northeast Somalia, on the Gulf of Aden. Once
it was alongside, armed men were seen on deck. Two mortar shells
were fired, a red flag was waved, and the ship ordered to heave-to or it
would be sunk. Eleven men from the 26 onboard the dhow boarded the
vessel and identified themselves as the Somali Coast Guard, North East
Region. After examining the cargo manifest, they told the master that
82
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the Bonsella would be used to apprehend fishing vessels operating off
the Somali coast without proper licenses. On September 10, the vessel,
still accompanied by the dhow, approached two suspected fishing
vessels, both of which turned out to be merchant ships. One was
pursued and ordered to stop via VHF radio messages. Instead it
increased speed and headed out to sea, despite two mortar shells being
fired in its direction. When the “coast guards” were asked why a ship
that was obviously not a fishing boat had been fired upon, the hijackers
explained that “they wanted to capture a faster vessel for their
patrolling operations” and promised to release the Bonsella once they
captured a ship that better met their needs. They ordered the master to
prepare the vessel’s Zodiac for future use during pursuit operations.
After moving past Cape Guardafui on September 12, the ship and dhow
headed for the open sea the next day, where they drifted while awaiting
passing vessels.
Late in the afternoon on the 13th, they chased a ship using the
dhow and the Zodiac but were unable to catch it. The master was
advised that his vessel and crew would be released the following day.
That day, September 14, the captors demanded that the ship’s cargo of
aid supplies as well as almost all of its stores and equipment be
discharged into the dhow before they would release the ship, and
threatened that if the crew resisted, they would be shot and the ship
sunk. By 1300 hours the transfer was complete. The “coast guards”
then demanded the ship’s cash, claiming they needed the money to pay
the stevedores at Boosaaso. The captain attempted to bluff it out but
was marched to the ship’s safe and made to open it at gunpoint. The
hijackers then returned to their dhow and ordered the master to sail for
Djibouti. Although the crew had been escorted everywhere at gunpoint
throughout their ordeal, fortunately none were injured.
Although this attack—along with others such as that on the
MV Full City in 1995, in which currency and alcohol were stolen—
share strong similarities with pirate attacks the world over, many of the
features that now distinguish Somali piracy from that which occurs
elsewhere were also evident, such as the use of “mother ships,” the
prevalence of kidnapping, the targeting of foreign fishing boats and aid
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ships, the distance from shore, and the involvement of corrupt political
figures. Experience from other pirate-prone areas around the world
strongly indicates that many, if not most, pirate incidents go
unreported. The level of organization displayed by this attack suggests
that the pirates were too well-practiced for it to have been anything
other than part of a pattern.
Golden Nori: Fears About Terrorism
In October 2007, the Panamanian-flagged, Japanese-owned
11,600 DWT chemical tanker Golden Nori, loaded in part with
benzene, was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden about 70 nm off the Somali
town of Caluula.83 This was one of the first recent hijackings in the
Gulf; most previous major ship attacks had taken place off the Indian
Ocean coast. The USS Porter responded to the ship’s distress signal
and succeeded in sinking the pirates’ skiffs, which were being towed
behind the tanker. With assistance from a German naval vessel, the
Porter prevented it from entering the port of Boossaso, but they could
not prevent the tanker being sailed to a point 380nm (704km) further
south, where it was then moored. Because benzene is particularly
volatile, fears were expressed that the hijacking was either terroristinspired or that the ship might fall into terrorist hands and be used as a
floating bomb to attack a major port. The U.S. Navy received
permission to enter Somali territorial waters to keep the Golden Nori
under close observation. Senior naval commanders took the view that
the permission granted could serve as a useful precedent in the future,
whether the attack was terrorist-inspired or not. The dock landing ship
USS Whidbey Island remained on station until the ship and its crew
was released in December, shortly after the pirates issued a demand for
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a $1 million ransom and the US Navy began to block supplies,
including khat, reaching the ship from the shore.84
Le Ponant: An SOF Raid, a UNSC Resolution, and an Attempted
Prosecution
In April 2008, the Le Ponant, an 850-ton, three-masted French
luxury sail cruise ship that was relocating from the Seychelles to the
Mediterranean for the summer cruising season with 30 crew but no
passengers on board, was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, triggering the
most robust counter-piracy response up to that point.85
The captain, Patrick Marchesseau, had set his course based on
naval advice and was following a track designed to take his ship down
the midline of the Gulf, about 100nm from both the Yemeni and
Somali coastlines. The ship was proceeding at its maximum economic
speed of 13kts. Pirates sensibly go to where the ships, are which is
where the navies and maritime safety organizations tell them they
should be. Ships first were told they should stay 50nm off the coast of
the Indian Ocean, so the pirates waited at the 50nm line; then they were
told to keep 100nm off the coast, so the pirates followed them there,
and so on. Some ships now hug the coast of India, which is where the
pirates are operating as well. Waiting for Le Ponant, therefore, was a
hijacked long-line fishing boat, sitting silent and stationary right where
it knew its potential victims would be sailing. Marchesseau was
sufficiently suspicious of the vessel to give it a wide berth, however.
He relaxed once it passed astern, only to be told that two skiffs carrying
a total of nine pirates were approaching them at speed. The pirates were
clearly experienced. They ignored the temptation to board the Le
Ponant using the yacht’s low marina deck at the stern. If they had done
so, they would have become entangled in the ropes the yacht was
trailing precisely for this purpose. The pirates instead took up positions
84
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either side of the yacht’s mid-point. This meant that when it tried to
zigzag, they were sitting at the points where the maneuver had the least
effect. They then approached the yacht and hooked a ladder over the
side. When crewmembers attempted to dislodge the ladders, the pirates
opened fire with AK-47s.
Once on board, the pirate’s leader, Ahmed, ordered
Marchesseau to make for Cape Guardafui, and tracked the fidelity of
the ship’s progress using a hand-held GPS receiver. Proceeding as
slowly as he dared, Marchesseau and his crew watched as the yacht was
intercepted by a Canadian frigate, the HMCS Charlottetown. It
launched its helicopter to look them over, but made no attempt to
intervene. The pirates were blithely unconcerned by its presence and
were equally unperturbed when it was joined and then overtaken by a
French corvette, the Commandant Bouan, which tracked the yacht as it
was sailed south along the Somali coast for another two days. If
anything, the pirates were more concerned about being pirated
themselves and shot at any small craft that approached too close. They
stopped once to pick up food and reinforcements. The food came in the
form of live goats that the pirates slaughtered, bled, butchered, and
cooked on deck as they needed them.
Their destination was the town of Gara’ad, a line of tin roofs
hugging the coast south of Eyl in Puntland. The yacht was anchored
about a mile off the town. Out to sea, the corvette was joined by a
French frigate and, over the horizon, by a helicopter carrier. The
helicopter carrier’s presence could not have been a secret, as fishing
vessels passed by it every day.
The Le Ponant was greeted upon arrival by about 70 townsfolk,
some 30 of whom were paid about $50 a day to help the pirates guard
their prize while they took turns to go ashore. It emerged subsequently
that this group was loosely affiliated with the group that hijacked the
Faina some months later. Senior figures also came on board, one of
whom was described as the “chairman” and another who acted as a
translator. A conference was convened at which it was decided to ask
for a ransom of $3 million.
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During the time he and his crew were held, Captain
Marchesseau was told that the pirates were subject to fines for breaches
of discipline: $100 for late return from shore leave; $500 for
discharging a weapon; $1,000 for sleeping on watch; $2,000 for
harming a hostage. American journalist William Langewiesche
suggests that reports issued after the hostages were released inflated the
importance of this list into a pirate code or charter, and comments that
“the penalties described, if remotely accurate, were probably poorly
enforced.”86 Yet the crew’s actual experience suggests that the pirates
did respond to discipline: one man who accidentally discharged his
weapon was immediately sent ashore and, when Marchesseau objected
to the theft of the crew’s possessions, those who took them were
reprimanded and the items returned. Langewiesche adds without further
explanation that in some cases this was only temporary.
The negotiations were conducted with the owners via the
yacht’s satellite phone. An initial counteroffer of $1.3 million was
rejected. After several days of haggling, $2.15 million was agreed on,
to be delivered directly to the pirates on board. This was one of the first
times the pirates had made such a demand, and the air-drop methods
that would later be developed were not yet in place. Instead, the money
was sent to the French frigate, which launched two Zodiacs to a point
some distance away from where the yacht was anchored. The pirates’
negotiating team approached the Zodiacs in skiffs. Three bags of
money were handed across, and the pirates counted it out in their boat
in sight of the French naval and gendarmerie team. When they were
satisfied, the pirate negotiators headed for the beach. The hostages,
minus Marchesseau, were allowed to board the Zodiacs, which took
them to the frigate. The captain’s three guards were collected by a skiff,
which also headed for Gara’ad. Marchesseau was left alone exactly
seven days after the pirates had first come aboard. A French SOF team
then arrived and evacuated him to the frigate.
Shortly afterwards, a report reached the task group that a SUV
was leaving the town. Helicopters were scrambled with SOF on board.
86
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The SUV was spotted, and its engine block shot out. Six men were
captured, and $200,000 of the ransom recovered. When the captives
were paraded before Marchesseau, however, he only recognized three
of them. The governor of the Mudug stated subsequently that only two
of the captives were pirates; the remaining four were khat dealers
unconnected with the events on board. The yacht’s crew was taken to
Djibouti and flown to France, where President Sarkozy himself greeted
them, deeming their return a great triumph. The captives were also sent
to France, where the authorities stated on several occasions that they
would be tried. So far, there has been no record of any trial taking
place, and what happened to these men is unclear. It is possible that
were returned to Puntland, where they may have been imprisoned.
As a consequence of the Le Ponant incident, the French
government made it clear that it would take a leading role in finding an
international solution to Somali piracy and annouced shortly afterwards
that it was working with the US and the UK on a joint resolution to be
put before the UN Security Council. This was adopted by the Council
in June 2008 as UNSC Resolution 1816.87 Interestingly, the French
operated a carrier group in the northern Arabian Sea in 2006 that
mounted air operations over Afghanistan, but they were unwilling to
place it under CTF-150 and therefore the group remained under
national control at all times.

IV. Strategies and Counterstrategies
History does not provide statesmen or officials with a template
for action, but experience suggests that once the necessary political will
has been aroused, any counter-piracy strategy needs to confront three
issues:
 How to conduct operations on land
 How to deny pirates access to capital, labor, and markets
 How to transform pirate activity using legal and economic
incentives
87
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Discussion Questions
1. What are the pirates’ weaknesses, strategically and tactically?
How can these weaknesses be exploited?
2. What would be the effect of specific international regulations
clarifying piracy and the international community’s reaction to it?
3. Pirates are considered both criminals and military enemies,
giving them an ambiguous status: they posses the rights and
protections of both groups. What is a workable solution to this?
4. How can anti-piracy success be measured? Harsher penalties
for pirates has led to harsher treatment of their victims. Are
civilian casulties justified in order to stop piracy?
5. What are key ingredients to a successful counter-piracy
operation? Is CTF-151 useful or necessary?
6. Are anti-piracy operations with sub-optimal results worth the
effort?

A. Conducting Operations on Land
Piracy is an act of depredation that is executed at sea but
planned and mounted from the land. Piracy’s weakest link is its need
for safe harbors and land-based support. Reducing their bases disrupts
and generally denies pirates the ability to operate. Failure to do so
prolongs counter-piracy operations and often renders them futile. The
reason why external force was, and still is, needed to undertake land
operations is almost always the presence of weak or ineffective
government ashore.
U.S. Navy operations against pirates in the West Indies during
the 1820s clearly demonstrate the limitations placed on the
effectiveness of a counter-piracy force when it is prevented from
operating on land against pirate bases, especially if the obstacle is a
hostile government. Because they were suspicious of American
motives, Spanish authorities effectively provided the pirates with
sanctuary. U.S. sailors were not allowed to land on Spanish territory,
and all captured pirates had to be surrendered to the Spanish authorities
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on Cuba or Puerto Rico. Although a combined force of U.S. and Royal
Navy vessels made life hazardous for the pirates, only when Spain
recognized it could not hold onto its imperial possessions and local
officials not only withdrew their support for the pirates’ activities but
also began to cooperate actively in piracy suppression did the outbreak
dwindle, eventually ending in 1829.88
B. Denying Access to Capital, Labor, and Markets
Piracy can be brought under control more quickly if the
economic opportunity that drives it is reduced or if the cost of
exploiting that opportunity is raised to the point where the reward
ceases to justify the risk. The inability to affect the economic factors
driving Somali piracy has been observable from its inception.
Taking action to deny pirates sanctuary in Somalia would alter
their risk-reward calculations dramatically because it would divert
more of their income into self-protection. Sanctuary is important to the
Somali business model: it enables hostages to be held and kept alive
cheaply. Kidnap and ransom was less successful around the Strait of
Malacca between roughly 2000 and 2005 because pirate negotiators
could not use time to their advantage and captives had to be moved
regularly to avoid discovery. Whatever their business model, all pirates
depend on markets where they can purchase the supplies and
equipment they need, hire the labor they require, and sell whatever they
plunder. Disrupting any one of these can affect pirate operations
adversely; disrupting all of them prevents marauders from operating.
Breaking the labor portion of this economic cycle requires
political and economic change within Somalia that will take time to be
effective. The focus has been on closing down the demand market
where hostages are turned into cash or cutting off the supply of
seafarers. The suggestion that demand can be extinguished by making
the payment of ransom illegal is callous; ransom is currently the only
way that hostages can regain their freedom. Those who advance this
argument do so knowing full well that a pool of seafarers will be
88
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trapped in Somalia but argue that the long-term gain of piracy
eradication outweighs the short-term misery and potential loss of life,
even though it may take two years or more for the policy to bite.
Further, only a few hundred sailors would be affected, most of who
come from developing countries. It seems hard to believe that such
calculated inhumanity would not have a depressive effect on the
willingness of all sailors to embark on Indian Ocean voyages, and this
might well spark a union labor embargo.
Using naval power to cut off the supply of seafarers is hugely
inefficient. In the absence of effective action on land or from the sea,
ship owners will have to invest more in self-protection, including
armed protective details where necessary.89 These are expensive, and if
all ships crossing the western Indian Ocean have to embark such
detachments, the cost of goods shipped by sea would necessarily
increase. That said, so far no ship passing Somalia with such a detail on
board has been hijacked or even attacked.
Ship self-protection measures range from the most basic, such
as standing adequate watches, maintaining maximum sustainable speed
throughout the transit, and securing all external doors, to the use of
powerful lights, high-pressures hoses to throw a curtain of water over
the ships’ sides, trailing ropes off the stern to prevent pirates gaining
access to what is often the lowest part of the ship, possibly fixing
booms to each side and trailing ropes in the water beside ships to
prevent lateral approaches, using anti-climb paint, and wrapping rails
with razor wire, which can be electrified for additional protection. The
use of private security guards, especially if they are armed, remains a
contentious issue. Nonetheless, it is a market into which the world’s
leading private security companies have plunged with alacrity,
providing services from risk assessment and security advice to hostage
89
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negotiation and armed personnel, at rates that already exceed the
amount pirates have extracted in ransom.
Although this represents a reversal of an economic trend
reaching back to the 18th century, as noted above, this development is
being pressed remorselessly by the international community, which
prefers to see industry bear the cost of piracy suppression.90 It is likely
to be ineffective since the pirates retain the escalatory initiative. This
was demonstrated in late 2010, when pirates began using hostages as
human shields to deter naval forces from intervening and, in some
cases, harming their captives once ashore to force the early payment of
ransom.91 These odious developments unfortunately represent a rational
response to a situation where the pirates find themselves the subject of
more aggressive naval tactics at sea, thus reducing the number of
successful hijackings, while at the same time their bases on land are left
untouched, thus leaving their sense of immunity intact. The
combination is almost an incentive to maximize their returns. It seems
likely that the rising cost of protection, coupled to the steady erosion of
the effectiveness of that protection as the pirates adapt, will increase
pressure on states from ship owners and labor unions to uphold their
obligations under the Law of the Sea to protect the right of innocent
passage.92
C. How to Achieve Pirate Transformation
Even today, combatants can be divided into two categories:
lawful and unlawful. Although modern pirates are treated as criminals,
90
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their predecessors were often regarded as combatants who fell for the
most part into the “unlawful” category. The famous Dutch jurist Hugo
Grotius (1586-1645) argued that pirates could undergo a legal
“mutation,” moving from the unlawful to the lawful categories. He
wrote: “A transformation [mutatio] may take place, not merely in the
case of individuals … but also in the case of groups, so that they who
have only been robbers upon embracing another mode of life becomes
a state” capable of providing for “the enjoyment of rights.”93
Effecting such a change inevitably means offering pardons and
other inducements. This may be repugnant, but it follows ineluctably
from piracy’s ambiguous status between the criminal and the political,
the cost and difficulty of prosecuting pirates under domestic law, and
the logistical, technical, and financial demands of suppressing an
activity that exploits the fluid medium of the sea. Although Rome and
Britain laid the foundation of all international and national law against
piracy today, they both recognized that major outbreaks needed to be
addressed flexibly, selectively offering the perpetrators pardon and, in
some cases, economic and political incentives to change, as well as
punishment and destruction if they did not.
This is not to suggest that amnesty can be made to work easily;
the historical record shows that is not the case. Application of this
experience to Somalia would be complicated by the fact that before
amnesty could be offered to the pirates and their organizers, it would
need to be extended to members of the political leadership and
officialdom in Puntland who benefit from and in many cases are
intimately involved in piracy operations. Development assistance
would also need to be in the mix. Amnesty and development would
need to be backed with penalties. While most of these would involve
the withdrawal of political or economic support, others would need to
be directed at individuals, including the cancellation of amnesty,
restrictions on travel, and the freezing of bank accounts and other assets
held overseas. If history is a reliable guide, the threat of punitive action
against pirate bases would also need to be in the mix. Naval patrols
93
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would need to continue, although better intelligence would make them
more productive, and a local coast guard with coordinated land- and
sea-based components would need to be raised as part of a coherent
political, economic, and judicial program.
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Appendix A: An Overview of the Key Social,
Cultural, Economic, and Political Issues Shaping
Somalia Today
The following section provides a short background and
explanation of key components of contemporary Somali history. It sets
the stage for comprehending and analyzing the rest of the case study.

Map 4: Somalia
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A. Somalia, 1960-1991
In 1960 Britain and Italy granted independence to the two
territories they separately controlled in the Horn of Africa. These
territories merged almost immediately to form the Republic of Somalia.
In 1969, following the assassination of the Republic’s first president,
the army under the command of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre
seized control. Barre was appointed president shortly thereafter and a
year later announced that scientific socialism would become the
country’s official ideology.94 The strength of his commitment was
always questionable as, like most colonial rulers, he was prepared to
accept aid from wherever he could get it; in fact Somalia depended
upon it.
The USSR was Barre’s sponsor until 1977, when it switched its
support from Somalia to the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia,
Somalia’s traditional enemy, led by Colonel Mengistu. In response,
Barre invaded the Ogaden region, an area that had been absorbed into
Ethiopia during its imperial wars of the 19th century but whose
population remained ethnically Somali. Barre’s aim was to secure his
regime’s domestic support by tapping into pan-Somali sentiment. He
was hoping to secure his objectives before the Soviets could come to
the aid of their new ally, but he miscalculated and Somalia’s army was
crushed.95
This defeat left Barre’s regime seriously weakened internally
and dependent more than ever on foreign aid from Arab countries and
especially the United States. Although he was no longer able to count
on internal unity and allegiance, the aid enabled Barre to expand the
army from around the 12,000 possible under Soviet largesse to 120,000
men under U.S. patronage; the disadvantage of this was that the sheer
size of the armed forces limited the funds available to manipulate
important social groups and exploit the divisions between them. This
94
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limitation forced Barre to make choices, and he chose to favor his
southern power base at the expense of the northern clans living in what
are now Somaliland and Puntland.96 As a consequence, the first armed
resistance to his rule arose in the north in 1978, focused on a clan-based
political grouping called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front
(SSDF) led by a one-time associate, Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed of
the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood clan-family. Barre’s response
was to arm the other Darood sub-clans and stir up inter-communal
rivalry.
The SSDF was the first of the modern-sounding political
groups based on traditional sub-clans that arose to challenge Barre.
This in turn provoked him into arming their traditional rivals to deflect
the violence that might otherwise have been directed against his
regime. The Majerteen resistance in the north-east was followed in
1981 by the Isaaq in the north-west. Barre’s bitter response to these
challenges lead to the 1988-91 civil war. His poisonous policy of
playing one sub-clan off against another backfired as the army fell apart
into clan-based militias. By January 1991, the game was up. Barre at
first fled south to the port of Kismayo and then abroad to Nigeria,
where he died in 1995.
B. The Reasons for Regime Failure
The United States abandoned Barre at the end of the Cold War.
Like the rulers of other ex-colonial states with only a rudimentary
government capacity that depended on superpower payments to
survive, he lost whatever authority and legitimacy he had been able to
buy.97 Barre, like the continent’s other discarded rulers, scrambled to
secure new sources of income to sustain the patronage system that had
kept him in power. In common with most other cases where the ruler’s
96
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authority was too weak to contain disruptive actions, the response by
powerful individuals or sub-groups in Somalia was to concentrate on
wealth accumulation rather than strengthening state institutions.
Rent extraction is payments over and above the real cost of
goods. It was conducted not by the rulers directly but by groups or
individuals who allied themselves to the ruler in return for economic
favors. This exchange of goods and services for government money
was scarcely more than state-sponsored criminality. Some rulers played
this role with conspicuous success, such as Mobuto Sese Seko in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although Barre had proved skilled
at attracting international aid and manipulating its proceeds for internal
political advantage, he proved less adept at extracting rents
domestically for the same purpose. His campaign of divide-and-rule
was insufficiently effective to save his regime, but all too effective at
sowing lasting discord between the clans and sub-clans. In the process
he taught his successors how to seize the assets they wanted and sustain
militias through predation. Access to political patronage became more
important than the efficient use of those assets, a trend that was
exacerbated by a 1975 tenancy law making it easier for bureaucrats to
expropriate village lands. The law disrupted the customary pattern of
land holding in the south, drawing in outsiders who drove the conflict
that exploded in the 1990s. The outsiders depended initially on the
coercive power of the Barre regime but, as this faltered, political
figures who were often Barre protégés began to field their own armed
gangs. As the regime’s power declined further, these gangs were able to
break the law with impunity and Somalia began its descent into
political and security chaos.
It is important to understand that discord and disorder did not
affect every part of Somalia equally and that civic and economic
activity continued successfully (in some cases extremely successfully)
in the absence of central government. Nonetheless, it is also the case
that some groups viewed the state’s collapse not as a crisis but as an
opportunity to make money and acquire prestige by using means that in
more peaceful circumstances would have been impossible and that
otherwise would have been beyond them. These means included
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pillage, protection, control of vital trades such as livestock and charcoal
exports, administration of trade-related economic activities such as
ports and airports, taxing of markets, exploitation of arms and migrant
flows, and the expropriation of land. Weaker groups were starved and
denied foreign aid to increase their political amenability.
This rent-seeking behavior is apparent in pirate activity in two
ways. First, it is at least arguable that some of the initial assaults on
international fishing vessels were perpetrated “bottom-up” by local
fishermen fighting to retain control over the rich fishing grounds off
Somalia that were now unprotected.98 From a very early stage,
however, their actions were countered by domestic warlord groups
intent on making money from the international fleets through the sale
of licenses.99 This evolution was epitomized in the case of Puntland by
its eventual alliance with Hassan Munya, who after absconding to
Yemen with a Barre financed fishing fleet in 1991 used it to prey
parasitically on local fishermen, forcing them to sell their catch to him
at rock-bottom prices.100 Second, this warlord activity was in line with
the more common “top-down’ exploitation of conflict perpetrated by
elites on land.101
Discussion Questions
1. What is meant when a state is described as “failed”? What are
the implications for security?
2. Is the term “failed state” an oversimplification? Has it led to
lazy thinking?
3. Like many ex-colonial states in Africa, Somalia was dependent
on foreign aid from the moment it was granted independence in
1960. What have been the political and economic consequences of
98

Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary? pp. 18-19; 20-21, and 24-25.
Ibid., pp. 19-20. The journalist Jay Bahadur quotes the pirate leader Boyah
commenting on the rapacious practices of the foreign fishing fleets and the
protection they received from warlord groups. Jay Bahadur, The Pirates of
Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011), p.
16.
100
Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary? pp. 21 and 22-23.
101
Ibid., p. 54.
99

90

Murphy: Piracy

that dependence for Somalia, for neighboring states, and for the
international community?
4. What should a “state” look like? What role do states play?
What happens when a state is weak, is failing, or has failed?
C. Somalia Since the Fall of Barre
Clans
Reaching any understanding of Somali piracy or, indeed, any
understanding of Somali society and politics generally, demands the
recognition that Somalia is a lineage-based society where almost
everyone is identified by his or her membership in a clan. Clans are the
principal source of individual and family security. Appreciation of
political relations requires an understanding of genealogical
relationships, although these do not determine enmity or goodwill,
merely context. There are six major clan confederations: the Hawiye,
Darood, Isaaq, and Dir, which are all traditionally pastoralists surviving
on animal herding alone; and the Rahanweyn and Dirgil, which are
largely agro-pastoralist, combining herding with arable farming, and
consequently have a lower social status. The clans form what
anthropologists term segmentary systems, which can best be visualized
as nesting Russian dolls fitting inside each other; such systems are
decentralized, highly individualistic, and democratic. Clan and subclans are led by “elders,’ but these individuals, generally senior, adult
males, have little instated authority and are not synonymous with
chiefs.
Experience in the years following independence demonstrated
that clan loyalty was often incompatible with bureaucratic government.
After Barre’s fall, the workings of government withered in the turmoil
of clan-based conflict. While people may turn to them in times of
violence and danger, it is important to note that clans only mobilize as
groups when conflict beckons. Clan boundaries are not, therefore,
barriers. Cooperation between individual members of different clans
and even between clan or sub-clan groupings is not merely possible but
commonplace. The Marehan (a sub-clan of the Darood) and the Haber
Gedir Ayr (a sub-clan of the Hawiye) formed the Jubba Valley Alliance
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in 2001 to control the lucrative traffic through the port of Kismayo. The
freedom to cooperate across clan lines was also a crucial factor in
Somali piracy: the “Somali Marines,” the highly organized group that
started operating from Haradheere in 2005, was based on an alliance
between elements within the Majerteen (Darood) and Suliman
(Hawiye) sub-clans.
It is important to emphasize that not everything in Somalia has
to happen within a person’s own clan. Cooperation across clans lines is
perfectly possible and occurs in many walks of life, commercial
activity being a good example. Islamic political movements have also
recruited support from multiple clan sources. The leadership of the
violent Islamist movement al-Shabaab is drawn from a number of
clans, although recently senior leadership positions have generally been
held by members of Isaaq sub-clans. Piracy was based on an intial
alliance, but recruits have also been drawn from outside this original
core. Some educated Somalis living abroad even suggest that they
consciously avoid asking each other lineage questions simply because
the experience of the past twenty years has demonstrated just how
divisive the answers can prove to be.

Discussion Questions
1. What are clans? How are they different from tribes? In what
ways should this difference shape the policy responses of external
actors?
2. Does cultural understanding matter? If so, how can policyrelevant information be gathered and taught effectively?
Warlords
Following Barre’s departure in 1991, much of the political
space was occupied by warlords. Kimberley Marten identifies such
figures as leaders (1) who use trained men to take advantage of the
disintegration of central authority to seize control over often small
geographical areas; (2) whose actions are based on self-interest, not
ideology; (3) whose authority is based on personal charisma and
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patronage ties to their followers; and (4) who erect barriers to trade
between the area they control and neighboring warlord-controlled areas
as a result of the fragmentation of political and economic structures. 102
Somalian examples include General Muhammad Farrah Aided (Haber
Gedir Ayr sub-clan); his competitor for control of Mogadishu, Ali
Mahdi Mohamed (Abgaal sub-clan); General Said Hersi Morgan
(Majerteen clan, Abdirahim sub-clan) in Kismayo; and Colonel
Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed (Majerteen clan) in Puntland.
Warlords’ Contribution to the Rise of Piracy
Warlords appear to have contributed to the rise of piracy as a
consequence of their interest in the commercial potential of fishing and
their complicity in toxic waste dumping off the coast. They followed
the model established by their mentor Barre, whose government issued
fishing licenses to foreign vessels in a somewhat unsystematic manner.
Once he had gone, the warlords and the political groups they controlled
began to issue licenses in their turn, including Yusuf’s Somali
Salvation Democratic Front. The UN reported that the sale of such
licenses “had acquired the features of a large-scale ‘protection’ racket,
indistinguishable in most cases from piracy” off Somalia’s northeastern
coast, which became Puntland, and that the resulting conflict between
fishing vessels sometimes resembled “naval warfare.”103
Warlord groups in the south began to copy this practice, even
establishing a London-based operation to “license’ foreign fishing
vessels in part of Somalia’s self-declared exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). This extends from the Kenyan border to about nine degrees
north, roughly coinciding with Puntland’s southern border.104 The
company, Africa Fisheries Management (Afnet), channeled the profits
into an account controlled by Hussein Ali Ahmed, who divided it up
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between five other warlords: Hussein Aideed, Ali Mahdi, Abdullahi
Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir, and General Morgan. The revenue generated
from licenses amounted to $600,000 to $1 million per year from 1996
to 1998 but had dwindled to around $300,000 a year by 2002.105 The
Transitional Federal Government benefited from a similar scheme,
issuing its own licenses after it was established in 2004.
In 1999, Yusuf’s government signed a deal with Hart Nimrod,
a British company registered in Bermuda, to establish a maritime
security force to police Puntland’s claimed EEZ and force foreign
vessels to purchase fishing licenses. The force was under-resourced
from the start; the ship it commissioned to conduct patrols was too slow
to catch any but the slowest license evader. Consequently the venture
made little money and was wound up after it was caught in the internal
battle between Yusuf and his political rivals in 2001. Unfortunately, its
80 or so coast guards, whose training presumably included boat
handling, navigation and vessel boarding, included some who put that
knowledge to subsequent use in piracy.106
Hazardous waste dumping has also been cited as a piracy
cause. It is an emotional issue, and repeated accusations have been
made concerning links between some members of the Somali elite and
Italian and Swiss companies that allegedly were front operations for the
Italian mafia. Two reports of waste washing up on land, including lowlevel nuclear waste, circulated in 1992 and 1996 but nothing more was
heard about it until 2004. At that time, following the Indian Ocean
tsunami, more barrels of toxic material were reportedly cast up on
sections of the Somali coastline. Several of these reports originated
from Greenpeace, which summarized their investigations and
interpretations of what had occurred in a 2010 report entitled “Toxic
Ships’. Although they were unable to prove their accusations
conclusively, they asserted that “waste was likely dumped in Somalia
in the period 1990-1997,” probably with the active connivance of
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warlord figures and their associates who controlled Mogadishu at the
time.107
The Battle for Mogadishu
More destructively, the battle between Aideed and Ali Mahdi
for control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, plumbed the depths of
savagery and set the pattern of unrestrained violence that continues to
scar what had been a flourishing and cosmopolitan city under Italian
rule. Although both Hawiye, they came from different sub-clans.
Aideed had been the Somali ambassador to India under Barre and in
1988 was chosen by the Haber Gedir Ayr sub-clan to lead their military
force; Ali Mahdi had risen to prominence through his close connections
to Barre, not as a consequence of any public support. However, he had
the means to equip fighters. In 1990 when Aideed left the city to pursue
Barre southward,Mahdi stayed behind and used his wealth to engineer
his election as interim president. But Aideed proved to be the more
effective and ruthless commander. The Haber Gedir Ayr, unlike Ali
Mahdi’s Abgaal clan, had no previous presence in Mogadishu. Aideed
changed that by recruiting young fighters from the sub-clan area in the
interior by promising them loot and women. Cut adrift from their
families and the sanctions maintained by clan elders, Aideed’s forces
fought with a murderous ferocity that their opponents could not match.
It is estimated that within nine months of Barre’s departure around
35,000 non-combatant Mogadishu residents lost their lives as the two
factions struggled for control. Aideed effectively won because he
forced Ali Mahdi to accept the division of the city between them.
To consolidate his position and fulfill his promise to his
fighters, Aideed cut off food and medical supplies to the refugee camps
in the areas he controlled, preventing the original inhabitants from
returning and reclaiming their looted homes and possessions. This
provoked international outrage. In 1992 the UN negotiated a ceasefire
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and introduced a military mission, United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM). Both Aideed and Ali Mahdi recognized the
political leverage that control of aid shipments would give them. They
vied for the right to supervise aid distribution and attacked the UN
when their demands were ignored. Once it was clear that the UN
humanitarian mission had largely failed, the US reluctantly agreed to
intervene to protect supplies. The force that arrived with great fanfare
in Mogadishu in December 1992 was named optimistically “Restore
Hope’ and the mission was redesignated UNITAF (United Task
Force).108
Aideed and the Haber Gedir Ayr were suspicious of the US
presence but hostile to the UN, particularly to its then SecretaryGeneral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who they saw as their enemy. The
precise trigger for the calamitous events recounted in Mark Bowden’s
book Black Hawk Down remains open to interpretation.109 Some
observers suggest that Aideed, looking to pick a fight with the UN
force, mounted a pre-meditated ambush on an isolated group of
Pakistani soldiers who were killed and then disemboweled to maximize
the terror effect of the attack. Others suggest that although Aideed felt
under pressure as a consequence of the international intervention, his
position was much stronger than that of his domestic rivals. They could
only change this relative balance by arguing in support of the powersharing arrangement being advanced by the UN that offered them a
way of wresting power from Aideed, something that they could not
achieve on their own.
Advocates of this view suggest that the crisis would probably
not have taken the course that it did if the hugely experienced U.S.
diplomat Robin Oakley had not been withdrawn, thus removing a brake
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on the confrontational UNITAF commander, Admiral Howe, who was
accustomed to getting his own way and had the political connections in
Washington to make that happen. There is no dispute that Aideed was a
ruthless leader with little concern for human life, either Somali or
foreign, but Howe was ill-suited to the fluid negotiation-based culture
of the Somalis. He was enraged by Aideed’s sense of his sub-clan’s
entitlement to power and deployed his forces without concern for the
messages these deployments sent. One of the most sensitive sites in the
city was the radio station, which Aideed controlled. In this
interpretation, Aideed, who had only been informed of UNITAF’s
decision to inspect the radio station the night before, saw the move,
which was assigned to a lightly armed Pakistani force, as proof that the
UN were taking sides in the conflict starting with an attempt to silence
his most influential propaganda tool. He reacted quickly, seeding the
crowd that gathered to watch and protest the Pakistanis’ activities with
gunmen who shot from inside the crowd, leaving 25 soldiers dead and
over 50 injured.
Howe’s response was to order an attack on the Adbi House
where Aideed and the clan elders met regularly. The meeting of July
12, 1993, was called to criticize Aideed and question his methods.
Missiles fired from US helicopters left 73 dead and hundreds wounded;
Aideed was not among them. The surprise attack outraged Somalis,
bolstered Aideed’s status, and undermined the UN’s claim that its
mission was entirely humanitarian.
Howe continued to press for Aideed’s arrest and in the
aftermath of the Abdi House debacle demanded that SOF be deployed
to help him achieve that aim. On October 3, in an ill-fated attempt to
capture Aideed and his inner circle, two US helicopters were destroyed,
18 US servicemen killed, and 73 wounded. The Clinton administration
decided almost immediately that the US should withdraw: all US troops
left by March 1994 and the final UN contingent left in March 1995. Its
departure was marked by mass looting by Somalis.110
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Evidence emerged later that al Qaeda had been in contact with
Aideed who took support where he could get it, although he was firmly
opposed to Islamism. The US helicopters were brought down using
fragmentation RPG rounds detonated close to the tail rotors, which
mimiced a tactic that al Qaeda had honed during the war against Soviet
forces in Afghanistan.111 Despite its own subsequent claims there is,
however, little evidence to suggest that al Qaeda’s actual participation
in the events of October was anything more than marginal.112
Discussion Questions
1. Why did the United States intervene in Somalia in 1993? What
changed during the course of the deployment to provoke Farah
Aideed?
2. Upon closer investigation, was it the UN and the US that
provoked Aideed?
What Explains the Difference Between North and South?
The conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi epitomized
Barre’s poisonous legacy that exploited, but did not create, the natural
divisions within Somali society. At first glance the existence of these
divisions is surprising. Somalia, unlike many post-colonial states in
Africa, is one of the largest ethnically, religiously, and linguistically
homogenous areas on the continent. The primary fault line lies between
the pastoralist north and the agro-pastoralist south. The two clan
confederations in the south, the Dirgil and Rahanweyn (known
collectively as the Sab), are the most open social groups and should,
theoretically, provide a basis for Somali nationalism. Even with this
advantage, however, they have never succeeded in overcoming the
northern clans’ genealogical pride and scorn for settled farmers. The
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long history of pastoralism, and the attitudes of its practitioners born of
years of migration and the hard living it entails, have proved a poor
grounding for the institutions of modern government – certainly one
centralized in Mogadishu – to the point where it might be more
accurate to describe Somalia as a “geographical expression” or
“cultural entity” than as a nation.
Two plausible explanations have been advanced for the
continuation of these differences even though both parts of Somalia
experienced colonial rule and suffered under Barre and his violent
aftermath. Lewis suggests that the answer lies in the differences
between Britain’s relatively light-handed colonial rule that left settled
social structures in today’s Somaliland largely alone, and Italy’s more
interventionist, centralized, and bureaucratic model.113 William Reno,
in contrast, argues that the vital distinction is the extent to which local
elites either joined with, or were excluded from, the political networks
that dominated commerce during the post-colonial period and were
such a feature under Barre. Political marginalization was more common
in the north, where groups were “forced to become more adept at
exploiting the economic opportunities of clandestine markets and
overseas employment on their own” largely because, lacking political
favor, they were in no position to form armed bands and simply loot
whatever they wanted.114
Centralism Versus Localism
UNOSOM ignored this gulf in experience and pursued the
creation of a centralized state in Somalia to the exclusion of all other
options. One long-time observer of Somali affairs, Matt Bryden,
writing in 1999, accused UNOSOM’s political section of trying to
build this state “around Somalia’s burgeoning warlord class” and
charged that when the operation withdrew in 1995, it “counted among
113
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its achievements the substitution of propaganda for diplomacy, the
exaltation of the political cult of warlordism, and the destabilization of
Somalia’s principal reservoirs of political stability: Somaliland and the
North-east,” which would take two years to return to pre-UNOSOM
stability.115
Ironically, it was an official from Ethiopia, a neighbor that
threatened Somalia and in turn feels threatened by what happens there,
who came up with a responsive solution to Somalia’s governance
problem. In the final paragraph of a 1998 paper submitted to the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
(IGAD) Partners Forum, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
noted that “local administrative structures could constitute building
blocks” for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia and that
“an important role could be played by civil society – the emergence and
role of which should be encouraged by the international community.”116
As seemingly straightforward and, in Bryden’s words, “banal”
as such a suggestion sounds, it is one that had eluded the international
community since Barre’s departure and continues to elude it to the
present day. It recognized the separate aspirations of Somaliland in the
northwest, the Rahanweyne fighters in Bay and Bakool in the
southwest, and the Hiiraan Regional Authority in south-central
Somalia, and was the spur that led to the creation of Puntland based on
the Majarteen areas in the northeast. By encouraging these various
regional embryonic entities with diplomatic attention and foreign aid,
the “building blocks” approach hoped to build sufficient confidence to
negotiate the re-establishment of national government. The
international community led by IGAD supported this approach between
1998 and 2000, but Ethiopian-Egyptian rivalry effectively scuppered its
chances.
The two states had vied for influence in Somalia since the mid19th century, and this rivalry flared once again starting in the 1950s.
The “building blocks” approach was Ethiopian in origin and continued
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to receive Ethiopian backing. As a result, Egypt endorsed the proposal
for a Transitional National Government (TNG), with Arab League
support. In August 2000, the TNG was adopted, despite the fact that the
majority of states had backed the “building blocks” initiative only a
year previously.117 By endorsing the TNG, the international community
reverted to its preferred solution, which was the one pushed so
assiduously by UNOSOM: the re-creation of a single government for
the whole of Somalia that mimicked normative government models,
although these models had not been universally successful outside their
original cultural settings. The ability of centralized government to
deliver public goods has been especially questionable across much of
Africa, including Somalia, which by then had become the “poster child’
of state failure.
In fact, between 1991 and 1999, twelve attempts were made to
reconcile Somalia’s internal factions and build a single government:
each one failed. Despite its UN mandate, the TNG likewise was a
failure, never controlling more than a small proportion of Somali
territory. Its mandate expired in 2003 and was followed in 2004 by
another UN-mandated body, the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG), which controlled even less territory. By the time of its expected
demise in August 2011, it controlled no more than a few square miles
of Mogadishu, courtesy of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers operating
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under an African Union mandate named AMISOM. The fact that UN
inertia led to the renewal of TFG’s mandate for a further year to August
2012 in no way changed either the fundamental weakness of the TFG
or the questionable appropriateness of a central government for all of
Somalia. The Darood clan had seen the TNG as a creation of the
Hawiye and worked with Ethiopia to bring it down. The TFG, the first
president of which was Abdullahi Yusuf, was viewed by the Hawiye as
working the other way; that is to say, as a Darood conspiracy against
them.
It remains the case that a version of the “building blocks”
approach pursued in the original spirit of localism and without the
international community’s intent to use it as a means to achieve its
preferred single-state solution looks to have the best chance of success.
The two most stable blocks – in fact the only two to have achieved any
degree of political maturity, although there is a marked difference
between them – are Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the
northeast.
Somaliland and Puntland
Somaliland is a Somali success story—one of the few. It has
maintained political stability through three peaceful changes of
government and has created an independent judiciary, an active and
free press, and a relatively healthy economy. It has nonetheless been
refused international recognition, which ignores its economic and
political achievements and flies in the face of both history and sensible
politics. Ioan Lewis has poured scorn on this ill-found reluctance,
writing that while governments in Mogadishu have been “recognized
and disingenuously promoted by the UN; in contrast the functioning
and democratically elected Somaliland government, that owed virtually
everything to its own efforts, remained unrecognized. This absurd
anomaly did nothing to assist southern Somalia’s recovery. However
much it may have served numerous layers of UN bureaucracy (and
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subsidiary international peace-makers)…this travesty of reality
condemned the TNG [and its successors] to a fantasy existence.”118
Puntland was established in 1998 at a conference of Darood
Harti clan leaders. They issued the Garowe Declaration, which made
public their intention of forming an administration for the Somalia’s
northeast. The Declaration was their response to the building blocks
initiative, which at that stage had some political momentum. The main
impetus for the move came from Abdullahi Yusuf’s Majarteen subclan, and unsurprisingly he was appointed the region’s first president.
He refused to step down when his term expired in 2001. With Ethiopian
backing, he stayed in office until taking up the presidency of the TFG
in 2004, again with Ethiopian support. Puntland’s political leadership
has always been associated with corruption of varying sorts and to
varying degrees. It seems unlikely that virulent piracy could have
thrived without Yusuf’s tacit approval, at a minimum. Although
opposed to piracy, his successor, Muse Adde, could do little to resist
what was already becoming an entrenched interest. Adde’s successor,
Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, in his turn is variously accused of being
a either a pirate financier or being in receipt of pirate patronage.
While the problems of working with Somaliland relate almost
entirely to diplomatic niceties, the obstacles to working with Puntland
extend beyond the diplomatic to selecting who, among a number of
characters of varying integrity, one can work at the “state” level and
identifying, from a distance, who at the local level either wields
sufficient power now or could win enough support in the near future to
make any engagement worthwhile. Although Puntland is largely stable
and the two most recent changes of government have been peaceful,
those in power have not displayed the probity and general good sense
of their Somaliland neighbors. This leaves too much room for
corruption and criminal behavior to flourish. Although the US
announced a “dual-track” approach to Somalia’s problems in 2010,
which despite denials effectively lessened its automatic support for the
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TFG, there is no evidence so far that the State Department has the
ability or appetite for such detailed engagement at the sub-state level.119
Discussion Questions
1. Is the effort to establish a single government for the whole of
Somalia a workable goal, or a waste of time? Why?
2. What alternatives are there, and who should be in charge of
developing and enforcing them?
Puntland’s Piracy Problem
Piracy is not the sole source of corruption in Puntland, but it is
a substantial one and buys the gangs much influence. To put it in
perspective, piracy ransom is probably the quasi-state’s second largest
source of income – admittedly by some margin—after remittance
payments from members of the Somali diaspora. Looked at historically,
this is not of itself enough to rule out some form of engagement. The
pirates and the men who back them are rational actors quite capable of
recognizing carrots and sticks. Piracy is a crime. It is also a commercial
opportunity. Somalis take their opportunities where they can, and
hijacking is wonderfully profitable; on occasions, incredibly so. Profit
optimization is possible because of the political protection provided by
Puntland’s political leadership and access to the territory’s relative
stability. This has enabled the gangs to organize their activities and
enjoy their spoils without having to invest prohibitive amounts of
money and manpower in land-based security.
On the other hand, pirate organizers are exposed to financial
risks if the pirates return without a prize, possible political risks in the
sense that clan interests need to be kept in balance, and, potentially,
personal risks if their movements and business interests outside
Puntland can be tracked and targeted. All three – but particularly the
first and last—offer levers that the U.S. and other states must press if
piracy is to be contained. However, as the political and naval response
so far has shown, risk cannot be expanded exponentially; alternative
119
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investment opportunities need to be in the mix as well. The concern is
that if piracy continues to be successful – if the counter-piracy policies
continue to fall short and the pirates do not begin to fight among
themselves – then the economic alternatives to piracy within Puntland
will be crowded out and the descent into criminality will continue.120
Discussion Questions
1. What political, economic, and social factors explain why piracy
finance and management has become concentrated in Puntland?
2. What evidence is there that illegal fishing and illegal waste
dumping caused Somali piracy?
The Somali Diaspora
One source—perhaps the most promising source—of the
wealth, skills, and entrepreneurship that will be needed to revive
Somalia and provide alternatives to piracy is the country’s diaspora
community. Overseas Somalis now constitute the largest African
community in the UAE, their businesses lining the streets of Dubai’s
commercial center, while thriving communities can be found
throughout Western Europe, including the U.K., and North America.
Significant Somali communities exist in the Netherlands, Norway,
Denmark and Sweden, while a perhaps surprising number have located
to Finland. In North America, Toronto and Minneapolis are the main
centers, although Columbus, OH, Washington, DC, Ottawa, ON, and
Atlanta, GA, have sizable populations as well. Not surprisingly, these
overseas residents have tended to coalesce around their clan roots.121
The result has been that diaspora interest in the struggles on the ground
in Somalia has continued in some cases to the point where the positions
held by expatriate Somalis has become more intransigent than the
positions held by those who remained in country. These overseas
120
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interests have on occasion used their financial clout to prolong the
conflict; in other cases, they have sought reconciliation and resolution,
as demonstrated in the case of the Chandlers.
Islam in Somalia
The issue of Muslim identity has not been an important
political factor in Somalia; to use an oft-repeated phrase, it has been a
“veil lightly worn.’ Arguably, Islam as experienced in Somalia is quite
different from Islam elsewhere: Somalia was converted originally by
Sufi sects, which interpret Islam tolerantly, while politics and religion
have never been unified as they have in most other parts of the Muslim
world.122 In the political realm, Islam has only served as a rallying cry
in response to foreign interference, whether British and Italian
colonialism or American and Ethiopian military intervention. Sufi
political quietism has been strained by the recent rise of activist
Islamism, however.123 While for the most part this has grown only
shallow roots in Somalia itself, it appears to have taken a stronger hold
among expatriate Somali communities in Kenya, Europe, and North
America, and among the ethnically Somali Ogadeni in Ethiopia.
During the Barre era, secular and public education was
neglected, and Islamic schools went some way toward filling this
educational vacuum. Funded by Saudi and Gulf sources, they tended to
espouse Salafism, the belief that every Islamic state must be based on
the earliest and “purest’ form of Islam. The present generation that is
in, or is vying for, power has been influenced by these teachings, in
some cases profoundly. For these Somalis, Salafism’s appeal lies in its
strong opposition to international trends and its rejection of existing
social structures, such as clannism, that in their view exacerbates
internal divisions and facilitates external interference in Somali
122
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affairs.124 Because Salafists held the strongest rejectionist views, they
attracted others who may not have fully understood or shared its
ideology. Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI), the group that has spawned the
current crop of violent jihadist groups operating in Somalia, was
formed during the 1980s, reached the peak of its influence in 1992
shortly after Barre fell and, by around 2005, had virtually ceased to
exist. Nonetheless, even if AIAI was weakened organizationally,
politically motivated Islam was on the upswing. While its adherents’
beliefs, aims, and methods were generally unpopular, they gained a
reputation for delivering what they promised, honestly and efficiently.
The key to their success lay not in the power of their ideas or the
quality of their organization, but in the consistent and substantial
financial support they received from wealthy patrons and Islamic
charities outside the country. The prolonged governmental collapse and
the tearing down of traditional social institutions, first by Barre and
then during the course of the civil war, left Somalia exposed to the
influence of Islamist groups that were no more interested in the wellbeing of its inhabitants than any other external player.
Islamic Militant Groups
When the ICU fell in January 2007, it was succeeded by alShabaab and Hizbul Islam, two militant Islamist groupings that drew
the bulk of their support from the southern part of Somalia. They were
opposed by Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, a clan-based, “moderate” Islamist
or Sufi-oriented grouping originating north of Mogadishu.
The largest and most militant of the Islamist groups was the
Salafist al-Shabaab (“youth” in Arabic). Although it only emerged
publically in 2003, it claims to have been founded in 1998. It has often
been portrayed as the ICU’s militia, but was more akin to a separate
faction that grew in strength and influence through the use of violence.
It carried out killings and attempted killings in Somaliland in 2003 and
2004 and murdered a BBC journalist in 2005.
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Although it played a leading role against the Ethiopian army in
December 2006, its fighters stayed behind to join the clan-based
resistance when the ICU was routed and its leaders driven into exile in
January 2007. Initially their contribution was marginal. Resistance
leaders wanted to keep it that way. Al-Shabaab, however, was able to
call on Islamist sympathizers overseas (and possibly in Eritrea125) to
provide it with resources sufficient to make it the most effective armed
opposition to the Ethiopian military presence. Ethiopia’s departure in
January 2009 left al-Shabaab the most powerful armed group in
southern Somalia and one consistently opposed to the internationally
recognized TFG, which it confined to a small part of Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab is not a monolithic entity – like so much in
Somalia, it is an uneasy coalition of interests—and its hard-line,
Wahabist-inspired social policies and punishments, including stoning
and amputation, have earned it fear but few friends.126 Although it is
described regularly as being associated with al-Qaeda and publically
announced its allegiance to Osama bin Laden in September 2009, how
deep that allegiance goes and how much it is driven by one faction
rather than the leadership as a whole remains open to doubt.
Its links to piracy have also been widely touted. Establishing
that ransom money helps fund al-Shabaab operations and may
ultimately be shared with al-Qaeda would draw increased resources to
the counter-piracy fight and might provoke the United States in
particular into prosecuting the problem more aggressively. Proof that
these suggested links exist remain elusive, although some senior
regional leaders and officials claim that the allegations are soundly
based. The difficulty is demonstrating that funds reach al-Shabaab and
are used to fund operations directly, rather than as a consequence of
personal or clan connections. Pirate operations are more exposed to
pressure from al-Shabaab now than previously. Because the pirates are
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now mostly located outside Puntland, they have been forced into areas
where they need to co-exist with the Islamists.127
Hizbul Islam (the “Party of God”) was the second Islamist
armed group operating in the south. It, too, was a coalition, but one
bound together more loosely than al-Shabaab. Its leading figure was
Sheik Aweys, an Islamic nationalist whose vision of a Somalia united
under sharia law lacked the simplicity of al-Shabaab’s vision as well as
the clan support to give it roots.128 Aweys moved twice against pirate
operations: once as leader of the ICU in 2006 when its forces
successfully drove the pirates out of Haradheere, and once when Hizbul
Islam attacked the town in 2010. This raid succeeded in driving the
pirates north, at least for a while, and unsettled pirate operations as far
away as Adado, as the Chandlers’ experience attests.129 The motive for
the attack had almost certainly little to do with principled opposition to
piracy and more to do with the need to gain control of a stretch of the
coast the group could use as a port or trans-shipment point. Despite the
presence of persistent conflict, economic life within Somalia has
continued and in some cases thrived: exports of livestock and charcoal
have continued, with imports of all that is needed to make life tolerable
within Somalia coming the other way. Control of ports and the income
they provide has therefore been important to all political groups since
Barre’s fall. Hizbul Islam lost its port revenue when it was driven out
of Kismayo by al-Shabaab, its then partner, during a power struggle in
October 2009.130 The need to replace it prompted the move on
127
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Haradheere.131 During 2010, reports that al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
had merged were interwoven with other reports that they were fighting
each other.132 By December, the consensus appeared to be that a merger
had taken place. The absorption of Hizbul Islam also has implications
for al-Shabaab. If Michael Weinstein is correct, it will tip the internal
balance within al-Shabaab away from the transnational terrorist wing,
which is the natural ally of al-Qaeda, and toward the more inwardlooking nationalist wing that, like the groups that made up Hizbul
Islam, seek to establish a Wahabist-Salafist Islamic state within
Somalia.133
The clan-based opposition was named Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca
(ASWJ), led by Sheikh Mahamed Moallem Hussein.134 Its first clash
with al-Shabaab took place even before the Ethiopian army withdrew in
2009.135 The group draws support from the major Hawiye sub-clans in
the central Hiiraan and Galgudud regions, including the Haber Gedir
Ayr. Other clans in the region include the Sa’ab and the Sulieman, both
of which have known connections with piracy. These sub-clans have
shown some support for ASWJ, but the Sa’ab also have their own
administration called the Galmudug State of Somali Republic. Adado,
Kismayo after battle,” Garowe Online, 1 October 2009. A copy of the Garowe
Declaration is available for public use. See Puntland Traditional Leaders
Conference (United Nations Development Program Somalia, 2009)
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the town nearest to where the Chandlers were held, lies in the center of
this region. ASWJ is affiliated with some non-Hawiye sub-clans as
well, such as the Marehan in Gedo, who traditionally have been hostile
to the Hawiye. The group signed a power-sharing deal with the TFG,
which had revived following the appointment of Sheik Ahmed to the
presidency in February 2010, but it withdrew from the deal in
September following the resignation of the TFG prime minister, Omar
Abdirashid Sharmarke.136
National and International Players
The Transitional Federal Government was established in
October 2004. It is recognized by the United Nations and most states as
the legitimate government of Somalia, even though it controls little
more than Mogadishu port, airport, and Villa Somalia, the presidential
palace. It depends on the presence of troops provided by Uganda and
Burundi, constituted as the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), to survive at all. The mandate provides for a force of
8,000 troops, but the numbers deployed have rarely exceeded 5,300.
TFG leaders have been accused of corruption, as have those of
Puntland, and many Somalis regard it as no more than another faction
vying for power like the rest. It asserts that if international donors
would only give it the necessary maritime security resources in terms of
coastal patrol craft, arms, and training it would be able to tackle piracy.
This claim, like so much else about it, is utterly illusory. Its current UN
mandate was due to expire on August 31, 2011, but institutional inertia
has caused it to be renewed for another year.
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